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ABSTRACT
For the past twenty years, large corporations have routinely devel-
oped and enforced industry-wide standards to address problems that
are only distantly related to earning a profit. This includes writing
detailed private regulations for environmental protection, national se-
curity, working conditions, and other topics formerly reserved to gov-
ernments. At the same time, the Supreme Court has said that the
Sherman Act forbids any "extra-governmental agency" that "pro-
vides extra-judicial tribunals for the determination and punishment of
violations."' On the face of things, this seems to ban private rules
altogether. Despite this, many U.S. policymakers continue to argue
that private standards are efficient and desirable. Many corporations
are sympathetic but fear legal liability and are reluctant to participate
unless and until the law is clarified.
This article asks how existing law can be reformed to arrive at princi-
pled rules for deciding when private standards violate the Sherman
Act. We begin with an historical account of recent private initiatives
to regulate food processing, fisheries, forestry, and coffee production.
We argue that these private rules are often just as effective as govern-
ment regulation. We then generalize from this evidence to explain
when and how large corporations are able to impose their preferences
through industry-wide standards. We also describe the politics that
determines how large corporations use this power. We argue that the
need to earn positive profit and defend market share frequently en-
courages-and sometimes forces-large companies to choose stan-
dards that please consumers. In these cases, consumers act as a
shadow electorate that constrains private power in much the same
way that real voters constrain elected officials. Finally, our examples
show that big corporations often decide to share power with smaller
rivals, suppliers, NGOs, and other stakeholders. We argue that these
delegations are genuine and make private standards more
accountable.
The article concludes by asking how current law can be reformed.
We argue that the Sherman Act serves two goals. The first is eco-
nomic efficiency. We argue that private standards advance this goal
by addressing problems ("externalities") that lack well-defined mar-
ket prices. We argue that private bodies should be allowed to address
such problems in the first instance knowing that government may
later step in to change or supplement policy. The second goal is to
1. Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941).
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protect democracy from private power. We argue that this danger is
minimal so long as: (a) market structure encourages corporations to
make choices that please consumers and other shadow electorates;
(b) the standard setting body represents a wide range of affected
stakeholders; or (c) industry selects the prevailing standard from mul-
tiple competing proposals. Significantly, all of these tests can be deter-
mined from objective evidence without obscure inquiries into when
private power becomes "illegitimate" or poses "a threat" to demo-
cratic politics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Industry self-governance has grown explosively over the past two
decades. In the process, big corporations have begun to regulate
problems that are only distantly related to earning a profit. This in-
cludes writing private regulations for environmental protection, na-
tional security, working conditions, and other topics formerly reserved
to governments. The law has not kept up. Seventy years ago, the Su-
preme Court declared that the Sherman Act bans any "extra-govern-
mental agency" that "provides extra-judicial tribunals for [the]
determination and punishment of violations." 2 This rule was simple
but unrealistic. Industry had, after all, been operating "extra-govern-
mental" tribunals and agencies since the 1890s. Most were facially
reasonable and many markets would have collapsed without them.
Worse, private standards were the wave of the future: By the 1980s,
100,000 people were writing and enforcing private rules.3 Presumably,
most of these standards were lawful, but it was hard to say which ones
or why.
Today, government officials acknowledge that private standards
often work better than public ones. Yet these same officials complain
that "rigid, exaggerated, or outdated interpretations" of antitrust law
keep many companies from participating.4 Meanwhile, regulators
want more private standards-and try to entice business by promising
to ignore Supreme Court holdings that are still on the books. This is
both unconvincing and unprincipled. Doing better will require clear
rules for deciding when private governance does and does not ad-
vance democratic values.
This article asks how U.S. law should manage the new self-govern-
ance. Part II introduces a framework for thinking about private
power and the politics that drive it. Part III profiles five recent (and
2. Id.
3. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Coordination Through Committees and Markets, 19
RAND J. ECoN. 235, 235 (1988).
4. See infra Section III.E.
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very ambitious) experiments in private power. Parts IV and V gener-
alize from these examples to present a theory of private power and
private politics. We emphasize how private governance institutions
differ from-and sometimes improve on-traditional government as
vehicles for democratic action. Part VI describes the massive but
under-theorized case law on private self-governance. Part VII ex-
tends these precedents within a new framework for deciding when pri-
vate power should receive deference. Part VIII presents a brief
conclusion.
II. PRIVATE POWER, PRIVATE POLITICS
Power is classically defined as the ability to influence or, less po-
litely, impose one's will on others.5 Significantly, the definition does
not distinguish between governments and private actors. This section
introduces the idea of private power and private politics.
Markets and Choice. We start by acknowledging the obvious: Pri-
vate power is the exception, not the rule. Indeed, the institution most
associated with the private sector-competitive markets-is the very
opposite of power. If A wants to help the environment she can buy
green energy from B. But this is an act of individual choice or charity:
If C wants to buy dirty coal-fired energy from D there is nothing to
stop him. In practice, many private standards are designed to facili-
tate this kind of choice. For example, A may not be able to tell
whether the energy she buys is green or not. Here, the obvious solu-
tion is to make the market more efficient by developing private stan-
dards that provide this information. 6 There is now a large literature
on how choice operates and is sometimes distorted or manipulated in
imperfect markets.7
Private Power. Governments follow a different model: Once Con-
gress passes a green energy statute, A and B can still have their trans-
5. Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. Sci. 201, 202-203 (1957) ("My intuitive
idea of power then, is something like this: A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to
do something that B would not otherwise do."); Tim Bithe, Global Private Politics: A Research
Agenda, Bus. & POL., Oct. 2010 at 1 (defining "private politics" as "'attempt[s] to impose [one's]
will on others' without relying on 'lawmaking or courts"' (quoting David P. Baron, Private Polit-
ics, 12 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 31, 31 (2003)).
6. For a formal microeconomic model of how private standards empower individual choice,
see Timothy Besely & Maitreesh Ghatak, Retailing Public Goods: The Economics of Corporate
Social Responsibility, 91 J. PuB. ECON. 1645 (2007).
7. See, e.g., Carolyn Fischer & Thomas P. Lyon, Competing Environmental Labels, 23 J. ECON.
& MGMT. STRATEGY (forthcoming Fall 2014) (surveying literature on market choice where stan-
dards are few in number or poorly trusted and understood by consumers), available at http://
webuser.bus.umich.edu/tplyon/PDF/Published%20Papers/Fischer%2Lyon%2OJEMS%2Revi-
sion%20Doublespaced%20with%2OFigures.pdf.
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action, but C and D cannot. To be meaningful, private power must
similarly find a way to frustrate C and D's transaction. We will see
that this is often possible in imperfect markets where demand is domi-
nated by a few large actors.8 Strangely, this economic coercion is fre-
quently exerted through the same private standards that empower
consumer choice. Recent scholarship emphasizes that real standards
often blend choice and compulsion and that this mix can evolve over
time.9
Private Politics. We will see10 that individual firms hardly ever pos-
sess enough economic power to impose their will on an entire indus-
try. Instead, several firms must first agree on a standard. In the
language of politics, this establishes a voting rule for deciding when
private standards become binding.
We know from conventional politics that many voting rules are pos-
sible. Familiar examples include majority rule, supermajorities, and
constitutional prohibitions against certain laws. The main difference
is that private voting rules-unlike public ones-are set by accidents
of market structure and not legislated. Ex ante, there is no reason to
think that any of these rules is legitimate. 1 Ex post, we will see that
large corporations often delegate their authority to NGOs, suppliers,
and other outside actors. This delegation necessarily creates new and
less accidental rules.
The Case for Private Governance. The fact that private actors can
exercise power does not mean that they should. In theory, govern-
ment could provide all the collective action that society needs. How-
ever, government's ability to intervene is limited. First, government
officials have limited resources and attention span. At any given time
most problems will go unregulated unless and until the private sector
steps in. 12 And when government does regulate, private solutions are
often faster.13 Second, governments have limited ability to monitor
8. For full economic details, see infra Part IV and the references cited therein.
9. See, e.g., Eric Brousseau & Emmanuel Raynaud, Climbing the Hierarchical Ladders of
Rules: A Life-Cycle Theory of Institutional Evolution, 79 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 65, 65-67
(2011) (describing how voluntary standards can become mandatory and even be subsumed into
government).
10. See infra Section III.
11. Supermajorities enforce a kind of legitimacy by guaranteeing that no action is ever taken
without widespread support. This is offset by the fact that simple majorities are routinely
disenfranchised.
12. See Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Address at the D.C. Bar Ass'n Sym-
posium: Self-Regulation and Antitrust (Feb. 19, 1998) ("Finally, government resources are lim-
ited and unlikely to grow in the future. Thus, many government agencies, like the FTC, have
sought to leverage their limited resources by promoting and encouraging self-regulation.").
13. Id.
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compliance. This is especially true for events that take place in com-
plex domestic markets14 or beyond national borders.15 These disabili-
ties are still greater in the developing world.16 Finally, government
regulators have limited information about how to intervene.17 This
makes government solutions more expensive than they need to be.
Private governance relaxes these limitations and expands the num-
ber of options open to society. At the same time, these options are
only beneficial when choice is legitimate. Within the European tradi-
tion, this implies that private politics should be reasonably democratic,
i.e. follow procedures designed to empower widely held values and
goals. We return to this subject in Sections IV and V.
III. THE NEW PRIVATE POWER
American industry has practiced self-governance since the Nine-
teenth Century. These institutions have expanded and become dra-
matically more ambitious since the 1990s.
A. The First Hundred Years
The story of private governance begins with the rise of Big Business
in the late Nineteenth Century.18 One early example involved insur-
ance. In theory, the new nationwide capital markets let factory own-
14. TIM BOTHE & WALTER MA'rTLI, THE NEw GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF
REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 25 (2011) ("Private governance has been encouraged by
the "excruciatingly slow pace of standards production" by state bodies "and, in some cases, lack
of the technical expertise and financial resources."); Id. at 5 (describing how EU delegated man-
ufactured goods standards to private sector because official negotiations were taking too long).
15. Tim Bdithe, Private Regulation in the Global Economy: A (P)Review, Bus. & POL., Oct.
2010, at 5-6 (describing decade-long delays in negotiating international standards for pesticides,
financial reporting, and manufacturing); Frederick Mayer & Gary Gereffi, Regulation and Eco-
nomic Globalization: Prospects and Limits of Private Governance, Bus. & POL., Oct. 2010, at 1-2
(International regulatory standards are generally weak and hard to enforce).
16. Mayer & Gereffi, supra note 15, at 4. (Developing governments "lacked the ability, and to
some extent the will, to regulate production.").
17. Pitofsky, supra note 12 ("[S]elf-regulation can bring the accumulated judgment and expe-
rience of an industry to bear on issues that are sometimes difficult for the government to define
with bright line rules."); see also Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, The Good, the
Bad and the Ugly: Trade Associations and Antitrust (Mar. 30, 2005) ("Simply put, self-regulation
allows those who know the industry best to help set the rules of the game."); see also, Cass R.
Sunstein, Winner-Take-Less Codes: The Case of Private Broadcasting, 6 UNIV. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 39 (1999) ("Government regulation is often the response to market failure, but a
code might be better, especially because of its comparative flexibility and because of the infor-
mational advantages of private enforcers ... direct regulation may lead the industry to provide
benefits more crudely and expensively than if a code were in place.").
18. As usual, there were precedents. During the Middle Ages, the University of Paris used its
massive purchasing power to insist that bookstores stop selling books that offended the Church
or State. GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM, BOOKS AND THEIR MAKERS DURING THE MIDDLE AGES
199-201 (1896).
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ers spread risk. In practice, investors still needed to satisfy themselves
that insureds met certain minimum safety standards. Otherwise, reck-
less insureds could quickly overwhelm the industry through adverse
selection. The insurance industry fixed this potentially fatal market
defect by creating a private legislature to write rules and a private
agency to enforce them.19 Other early schemes addressed market
flaws connected with experience goods,20 transactions costs, 21 and
interoperability.22
These standards were fairly easy to enforce. After all, industry
would collapse without them. Over time, however, firms started try-
ing to impose private standards on markets that were already stable.
One obvious strategy was to ask government to give private standards
the force of law or, less formally, threaten regulation if industry failed
to regulate itself.23 However, such strategies only work where govern-
19. See Franco Furger, Accountability and Systems of Self-Governance: The Case of the Mari-
time Industry, 19 LAW & POL'Y 445 (1997) (describing how Underwriters Laboratories and Fac-
tory Mutual regulated product design and manufacturing operations). It is conventional to
argue that insureds voluntarily agree to private tribunals when they decide to purchase insur-
ance. This is a thin distinction for industries where firms need insurance to earn a profit or stay
in business.
20. See Andrew King & Michael Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The
Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 698 (2000) (describing pri-
vate regulation of books and movies); David A. Garvin, Can Self-Regulation Work?, 25 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 37 (1983) (describing private standards for doctors, lawyers, and other
professionals).
21. Chris Doyle, Self Regulation and Statutory Regulation, 8 Bus. STRATEGY REV. 35 (1997);
see Garvin, supra note 20.
22. Garvin, supra note 20, at 44-45; Tim Bithe, Engineering Uncontestedness? The Origins
and Institutional Development of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), Bus. &
POL., Oct. 2010, at 22.
23. This could be done in various ways. The most obvious was explicit government regulation
and legislation. Anil K. Gupta & Lawrence J. Lad, Industry Self-Regulation: An Economic, Or-
ganizational, and Political Analysis, 8 ACAD. MGMT. 416 (1983) (securities dealers and account-
ing standards); King & Lenox, supra note 20, at 716 (pollution and public safety standards for
manufacturing); Furger, supra note 19; Tim Btithe, Private Regulation in the Global Economy:
Guest Editor's Note, Bus. & POL., Oct. 2010, at 15-16 (broadcasters and Canadian medical de-
vices). Government could also elicit action by threatening to intervene in the future. King &
Lenox, supra note 20; Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond
False Dichotomies, 19 LAw & POL'Y 529 (1997) (describing private greenhouse gas regulation in
U.S. and New Zealand); DANIEL J. FIORINO, VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES, REGULATION AND NA-
NOTECHNOLOGY OVERSIGHT: CHARTING A PATH 19, available at http://www.nanotechproject.
org/process/assets/files/8347/pen-19.pdf (listing EPA-sponsored initiatives); William A. Pizer,
Richard Morgenstern & Jhih-Shyang Shih, Evaluating Voluntary Climate Programs in the United
States 8-13 (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 2008), available at http://www.rff.org/
RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-08-13.pdf. Finally, many industries self-regulated because they were
convinced that failure to act would invite still more onerous government intervention. Gupta &
Lad, supra note 24 (quoting AHAM's technical director: "[Tihe only way to avoid government
regulation is to move faster than the government [through] judicious self-regulation."); see also,
Michael J. Lenox & Jennifer Nash, Industry Self-Regulation and Adverse Selection: A Compari-
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ment cared strongly about an issue. This meant that industry often
ended up doing the government's bidding.24
A better solution took advantage of large firms' power over their
trading partners.25 The most important early example was the Fashion
Originator's Guild of America (FOGA),26 whose members produced
60% of all quality womenswear sold in the U.S.27 In the 1930s,
FOGA announced that its members would stop selling to any retailer
that it determined to be "unethical." 2 8 Since most retailers needed
members' products to stay competitive, 29 at least 12,000 retailers
promptly agreed to "cooperate." 30 Soon, FOGA was running a paral-
lel government that included offices for registering intellectual prop-
erty,31 monitoring retailers, 32 and conducting trials and appeals.33
This was too much for the Supreme Court, which struck down the
arrangement on grounds that the Sherman Act barred "extra-govern-
mental agenc[ies]." 34
son Across Four Trade Association Programs, 12 Bus. STRATEGY & ENV'T 343, 344 (2003)
(quoting Kodak's CEO: "[I]f industry doesn't take the lead on this issue, government will.");
Bithe, supra note 15, at 20 (nuclear power self-regulation was motivated by desire to preempt
government standards); and Gupta & Lad, supra note 23 (documenting how fears of government
intervention led to accounting, Underwriters Laboratories, and baby food standards).
24. Theorists who model private governance as a "shadow of hierarchy" argue that private
actors preferences should be viewed as a (generally modest) correction to official policy. Na Li
Dawson & Kathleen Segerson, Voluntary Agreement With Industries: Participation Incentives
With Industry-Wide Targets, 84 LAND ECON. 97 (2008); Peter M. DeMarzo, Michael J. Fishman,
& Kathleen M. Hagerty, Reputations, Investigations, and Self-Regualation, (Sept. 2007) (prelimi-
nary and incomplete), available at http://www.kelley.indiana.edu/Finance/Research/seminar-
series/files/fishman07.pdf.
25. For full economic details, see infra Section IV.A.
26. Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
27. Id. at 462.
28. Id. at 461. FOGA's standards attempted to outlaw copying of original dress designs, con-
tributing funds to retailers' ad campaigns, offering certain discounts, holding special sales, selling
directly to the public, selling in private homes, and holding fashion shows where no merchandise
was purchased or delivered. Id. at 463.
29. Id. at 462.
30. More than half protested that they had been coerced. Id. at 461-62.
31. Designs were protected in two private registration offices. Fashion Originators' Guild,
Inc., 312 U.S. at 462-63.
32. FOGA hired professional shoppers to find stores carrying pirated designs. Id. It also
conducted periodic audits and assessed fines against members who sold to blacklisted retailers.
Id. at 463.
33. Id. at 462-63.
34. Id. at 465-66.
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B. Pioneers: Dolphin Safe Tuna
The rise of global supply chains in the 1980s enormously expanded
retailers' power.35 At the same time, growing consumer pressure en-
couraged dominant firms to use their power for public purposes. The
earliest example involved dolphin-safe tuna. Naively, one might have
expected the three big tuna buyers to control suppliers in proportion
to their purchases. This would have led to controls on perhaps half
the fishing fleet. In fact, the standard became universal.
History. Consumers became concerned that tuna fishermen were
killing dolphins in the 1980s.3 6 In 1990, NGO Earth Island partnered
with Star Kist, the world's largest tuna processor, to develop "Dolphin
Safe" standards.37 These were promptly endorsed by Star-Kist's main
rivals, Chicken of the Sea and Bumble Bee. Together, the Big Three
controlled 84% of the U.S. canned tuna market,38 which made up half
of the world market.39
In a perfect market, other buyers would have been free to reject the
Big Three's standard. But this ignores suppliers' need to preserve
economies of scale. Once the Big Three had spoken, maintaining sep-
arate facilities for non-compliant tuna became impractically expen-
sive. By 2011, more than 471 companies in sixty-seven countries had
35. The power of domestic supply chains had been clear for years. See, e.g., Or. Rest. &
Beverage Ass'n v. United States, 429 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1970) (Tavern owners association forced
suppliers to halt direct sales to the public); Tropic Film Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 319
F.Supp. 1247, 1249 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (Nine companies that produced and distributed "a very sub-
stantial majority of the films shown in this country" established private rules regulating who
could see movies); United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C. 1982)
(Three large networks regulated ads shown to 85% of all TV viewers).
36. Elise Golan, Fred Kuchler & Lorainne Mitchell, Economics of Food Labeling, 24 J. CON-
SUMER POL'Y 117, 155 (2001).
37. Golan, Kuchler & Mitchell, supra note 36, at 155; see also Tim Carman, WTO: 'Dolphin-
Safe' Label Discriminates Against Mexico, WASH. PosT ALL WE CAN EAT BLOG (May 16, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/all-we-can-eat/post/wto-dolphin-safe-label-discriminates-
against-mexico/2012/05/16/gIQAwnCcUU-blog.html. "Dolphin Safe" standards outlaw, among
other things, the "intentional chasing, netting or encirclement of dolphins during an entire tuna
fishing trip"; the use of drift gill nets; accidental killing or serious injury to dolphins during net
sets; and mixing dolphin-safe and dolphin-deadly tuna in individual boat wells or processing
facilities. International 'Dolphin Safe' Standards For Tuna, EARTH ISLAND INST. (last visited
May 13, 2014), http://www.earthisland.org/immp/DolSafeStandard.html [hereinafter Interna-
tional Standards]. The rules also require companies to pay for an independent observer each
time vessels exceeding 400 gross tons enter the Eastern Tropical Pacific. Id. All procurement
records and processing, storage, and transshipment facilities must similarly be open to monitor-
ing. Id.
38. Golan, Kuchler & Mitchell, supra note 36, at 155; see also Carman, supra note 37 (Big
Three market share is "more than 80%.").
39. Golan, Kuchler & Mitchell, supra note 36, at 158; The Tuna Boycott That Led to the
Dolphin Safe Label, EUROPEAN CETACEAN BYCATCH CAMPAIGN (last visited May 13, 2014),
http://www.eurocbc.org/page322.html [hereinafter Tuna Boycott].
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joined the scheme. 40 The result was a kind of miniature government
in which industry paid Earth Island to inspect canneries, docks, and
fishing vessels.41
Interactions with Government. Government's relation to the private
initiative was complex. On the one hand, suppliers knew that adopt-
ing the Big Three standard would help them avoid U.S. diplomatic
pressure and trade embargoes. This helped spread the private stan-
dard.42 On the other, the private standard remained independent of-
and sometimes conflicted with-the "official" U.S. standard that Con-
gress created in November 1991.43 It was also more durable: World-
wide fishing practices barely changed when the World Trade
Organization struck down the U.S. standard in 2012.44
Effectiveness. The private dolphin safe standard was remarkably ef-
fective. Indeed, it is hard to see how conventional treaties or statutes
could have done better. NGOs report that the private standard virtu-
ally eliminated dolphin-deadly tuna from "90% of the world's canned
tuna markets," including Europe, Canada, and Australia. By 1997
only 2.9% of the world's tuna supply was caught by chasing and set-
ting nets on dolphins, and dolphin mortality had dropped 97% com-
pared to the 1980s.45
C. Private Regulation: Food Safety
Dolphin-safe tuna rules were simple enough to be written down on
a single piece of paper. The next self-governance experiment showed
40. Adopters include the U.S. Tuna Foundation, commercial fishermen, small canneries, bro-
kers, import associations, retail stores, and restaurant chains. Golan, Kuchler & Mitchell, supra
note 36, at 155; see also Carman, supra note 37; International Standards, supra note 37; Approved
Dolphin-Safe Tuna Processing Companies & Fishing Companies, EARTH ISLAND INST. (last vis-
ited May 13, 2014), http://www.earthisland.org/dolphinSafeTuna/DolphinSafeCanners.html.
41. Tuna Boycott, supra note 39. See also, EARTH ISLAND INST., INTERNATIONAL TUNA MON-
ITORING PROGRAM 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2011), available at http://www.earthisland.org/
dolphinSafeTunalassets/20llMonitorReport.pdf (Earth Island performed 493 inspections in
2011).
42. Golan, Kuchler & Mitchell, supra note 36, at 158.
43. Id.; 16 USC § 1385 (2006). Earth Island even called for a consumer boycott of the Com-
merce Department standard. International Dolphin Safe Monitoring Program, EARTH ISLAND
INST. (last visited May 13, 2014), http://www.earthisland.org/dolphinSafeTuna/.
44. Dispute Settlement, United States - Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and
Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381 (May 16, 2012), available at https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/dispue/cases_e/ds381_e.htm; Carman, supra note 38.
45. International Standards supra note 38; MICHAEL E. CONROY, BRANDED!: How THE 'CER-
TIFICATION REVOLUTION' IS TRANSFORMING GLOBAL CORPORATIONS 46 (2007); Tuna Boycott,
supra note 39 (Dolphin mortality in the Eastern Tropical Pacific fell from "80-100,000 annually
in the late 1980's, to under 3,000 dolphins annually today.").
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that industries could design and enforce the kind of complex regula-
tory codes normally associated with government.
History. Many large European supermarkets responded to "Mad
Cow Disease" by imposing detailed handling and inspection require-
ments on their suppliers. 46 For their part, suppliers-who typically
faced "a huge retailer they can't afford to lose" 47-hardly ever re-
sisted. At the same time, the proliferation of standards forced suppli-
ers to maintain multiple overlapping inventory and compliance
systems 48 and limited the number of suppliers who could bid for or-
ders.49 This created an obvious financial incentive to unify the various
individual retailers' rules within a single code.
In 1996, the Association of UK Retailers began work on an indus-
try-wide food code.50 This was promptly adopted throughout the
UK 51 and Holland. 52 Similar retail food association initiatives pro-
duced the German/French "International Food Standard" (IFS) in
46. GFSI Guidance Document Sixth Edition Overview, GLOBAL FOOD SAFETY INITIATIVE
(last visited May 13, 2014), http://www.mygfsi.com/technical-resources/guidance-document.html
(GFSI was organized in response to "several high-profile recalls, quarantines, and the associated
negative publicity.").
47. Rhonda Wellik, Global Food Safety Initiative Improves Organizational Culture, Efficiency
in Food Industry, FOOD QUALITY & SAFETY Apr./May 2012, available at http://www.foodquality.
com/details/article/1721905/GlobalFoodSafetyInitiativeImproves.Organizational Culture
Efficiency-inFood.html?tzcheck=1; Doris Fuchs & Agni Kalfagianni, The Causes and Conse-
quences Private Food Governance, Bus. & POL., Oct. 2010, at 13 (Retail supermarkets are highly
concentrated with the top five retailers controlling at least 70% of the market in most countries);
Tetty Havinga, Actors in Private Food Regulation: Taking Responsibility or Passing the Buck to
Someone Else?, (Nimigen Sociology of Law Working Paper Series No. 2008/1) (This purchasing
power makes "retail food safety standards obligatory for all who want to stay in the [U.K.]
market."); Jaap van der Kloet & Tettty Havinga, Private Food Regulation from a Regulatee's
Perspective, (Nigmegen Sociology of Law Working Papers Series No. 2008/07) (The "purchasing
power of supermarkets makes retail food safety standards in fact obligatory for many
manufacturers.").
48. See Wellik, supra note 47 (noting that, in one instance, adoption of a common standard
reduced number of required audits from 17 to just two per year).
49. Doris Fuchs, Agni Khalfagiannini & Maarten Arendtsen, Retail Power, Private Standards,
and Sustainability in the Global Food System, in CORPORATE POWER IN GLOBAL AGRIFOOD
GOVERNANCE 29, 41 (Jennifer Clapp & Doris Fuchs eds., 2009) (Uniform standards "induce
supplier participation."). Small supermarkets that adopted an idiosyncratic standard might not
attract any bids at all. Id.
50. van der Kloet & Havinga, supra note 47.
51. Tetty Havinga, Private Regulation of Food Safety by Supermarkets, 28 LAv & POL'Y 515
(2006) (All but one U.K. supermarket uses BRC).
52. Id. (Dutch retailers adopted the British Retail Consortium Standard because suppliers
were "more prepared to accept that").
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2002-200353 and the American "Safe Quality Food" (SOF) standard in
2003.54
Despite this progress, the existence of disparate regional standards
remained a drag on long-distance trade. In 1997, thirteen large retail-
ers created the EurepGAP (later GlobalGAP) standard to harmonize
standards across Europe.55 By then, however, local and regional stan-
dards were already entrenched. Instead, GlobalGap became a de
facto fourth standard, mostly in the developing world.56 By 2006, the
four regional standards covered more than three-quarters of the food
sold in supermarkets worldwide.57
More recent initiatives stress that there are many acceptable ways
to ensure food quality. Beginning in the 1990s, many European super-
markets began to recognize more than one private standard at time.58
In 2000, a group of international retailers created a Gobal Food Safety
Initiative (GFSI) to formalize the process. 59 By 2006, GFSI had rec-
53. Doris Fuchs, Agni Khalfagiannini & Tetty Havinga, Actors in Private Food Governance:
The Legitimacy of Retail Standards and Multistakeholder Initiatives with Civil Society Participa-
tion, 28 AGRIC. & Hum. VALUES 353, 356 (2008). Many Italian, Austrian, Polish, Spanish, and
Swiss retailers have since adopted the standard. Id.
54. Id. U.S. Food Management Institute represents three quarters of all U.S. retail food stores
and 200 companies in 50 countries.
55. Fuchs & Kalfagianni, supra note 47, at 4 (EurepGAP was formed to harmonize conflicting
national standards.); van der Kloet & Havinga, supra note 47; Tim Lang & David Barling, The
Environmental Impact of Supermarkets: Mapping the Terrain and the Policy Problems in the UK,
in SUPERMARKETS AND AGRIFOOD SUPPLY CHAINS: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE PRODUCTION
AND CONSUMPTION OF FOODs 192, 203 (David Burch & Geoffrey Lawrence eds., 2007); Eurep-
GAP, WIKIPEDIA (last visited May 13, 2014), http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilEurepGAP. Europe-
GAP has since grown to include "a Who's Who of European food retailers." Hugh Campbell &
Richard Le Heron, Supermarkets, Producers and Audit Technologies: The Constitutive Micro-
Politics of Food, Legitimacy, and Governance, in SUPERMARKETS AND AGRIFOOD SUPPLY, supra
note 55, at 141.
56. van der Kloet & Havinga, supra note 47.
57. Some estimates run as high as 99%. Fuchs, Khalfagiannini & Havinga, supra note 53, at
356.
58. van der Kloet & Havinga, supra note 47.
59. Fuchs, Khalfagiannini & Arendtsen, supra note 49, at 36; Havinga, supra note 47, at 524.
GFSI Guidance Document, supra note 46 ("[T]he GFSI Guidance Document provides a tem-
plate against which food safety management schemes can be benchmarked and recognised as
science-based, contemporary, and rigorous. It is a tool which fulfills one of the main objectives
of GFSI, that of determining equivalency between food safety management systems.").
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ognized all four regional standards.60 GFSI members currently ac-
count for sixty-five percent of worldwide retail food sales.61
Politics. The big retailers had relatively little information about
their suppliers' operations. This made it hard to know which food
safety rules were cost-effective and/or economically sustainable.
Broadly speaking, retailers used two strategies to solve the problem.
The first strategy was to guess at an appropriate standard and then
encourage suppliers to adopt it. After that, competition would spread
compliance throughout the industry. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that this pressure is intense.62 There is also a second level of competi-
tion: When one of the big four regional standards upgrades its proce-
dures, the rest often feel compelled to follow.
The second strategy was superficially simpler: Just ask suppliers for
advice. But there was a problem. Suppliers worried that candid dis-
closures could show retailers that even even harsher demands were
possible. The retailers who founded GlobalGap and GFSI eliminated
this concern by opening their organizations so that suppliers received
roughly as many votes as retailers.63 In this case, at least, retailers
seem to have decided that any loss of power was less important than
acquiring the information needed to design cheaper and more effec-
tive standards.
Strikingly, GlobalGap also shared power with NGOs and consumer
groups. This helped convince regulators and the public that Global-
60. In 2008, supermarket giants Tesco, ICA, Metro, Migros, Ahold, WalMart, and Delhaize
endorsed the same four standards. What is GFSI?, GLOBAL FOOD SAFETY INITIATIVE (last vis-
ited May, 13, 2014), http://www.mygfsi.comlabout-gfsi.html (describing first edition of GFSI's
2001 Guidance Document). This encouraged still more retailers to join GFSI. Wellik, supra
note 47 (Certification consultants report that "WalMart's backing was huge for GFSI."). As of
2013, GSFI had either endorsed or was in the process of reviewing eleven distinct standards.
GFSI Benchmarking Process, GLOBAL FOOD SAFETY INITIATIVE (last visited May 13, 2014),
http://www.mygfsi.com/gfsi-benchmarking-general/applications-update.html.
61. Fuchs, Khalfagiannini & Arendtsen, supra note 49, at 36.
62. Retailer demands for GFSI alarmed retailers who "didn't know which way to turn because
their system had been operating for 10 years with little change and they had not kept pace.
Suddenly they faced the real prospect of losing a lot of business." Wellik, supra note 47.
63. Fuchs, Khalfagiannini & Havinga, supra note 53, at 361 (GlobalGAP membership was
expanded in 2001 to include roughly equal numbers of suppliers and retailers.); GlobalG.A.P.
Technical Cornittees, GLOBALG.A.P., http://www.globalgap.org/uk-en/who-we-are/governance/
technical-committees/ (last visited May 13, 2014) (GFSI's current board is evenly dividied be-
tween suppliers and retailers). But see Agni Kalfagianni, The Effectiveness of Private Food (Re-
tail) Governance for Sustainability, 12 INsT. ENv'T STUD. 1 (2010) (arguing that GFSI is
dominated by retailers and large suppliers with small producers and NGOs limited to a consulta-
tive role). The big regional standards are still dominated by retailers. Fuchs, Khalfagiannini &
Hanvinga, supra note 53, at 362 (SOF); Havinga supra note 47 (IFS and BRC).
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Gap's food safety standards were more than just "greenwashing." 6 4
Once again, the benefits of delegation outweighed its costs.
Interactions With Government. The new private food safety stan-
dards blunted whatever political pressure had previously existed for
government to regulate directly.65 In 2002, the EU recognized the ob-
vious by giving business primary responsibility for food safety.66 This
probably made sense given the EU's limited regulatory resources, 67
especially since regulators could still influence private standards
informally.68
Results. Scholars agree that private food standards have produced a
kind of private government 69 that imposes significant costs on suppli-
ers.70 The resulting regulations affect thousands of people around the
world.71 Whether private regulation was wise is a separate issue,72 al-
though recent European food scandals do not seem obviously worse
than traditional regulatory failures. 73
64. Campbell & Le Heron, supra note 55 at 142.
65. Fuchs & Kalfagianni, supra note 47 at 20 (Global Gap has prevented national food safety
regulation from developing in Europe.).
66. Id. at 11; Commission Regulation 178/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 031) 1 (EC). I am grateful to
Prof. Karl Riesenhuber for explaining EC regulations in this area.
67. Fuchs & Kalfagianni, supra note 47, 18 n.76 ("We cannot be certain that ... governments
would have implemented superior regulation . . . in comparison to retail standards."); Btithe,
supra note 15, at 5 (Even the U.S. finds it hard to regulate certain kinds of food.).
68. Havinga, supra note 51, at 515 (describing Dutch regulatory pressure on private food
inspections).
69. Bithe, supra note 5, at 13 ("[M]onopsony gives the retailers tremendous power over the
food producers" which they have used to regulate "large parts of the food supply of the Western
world."); Bithe, supra note 15, at 1 (Regulators "exercise power in a Dahlian sense."); Fuchs &
Kalfagianni, supra note 47, at 10 ("[Rletail food corporations" have "the power to govern.");
Havinga, supra note 52, at 529 (Private regulation is "detailed" with "a high degree of interven-
tion curtailing freedom of regulated firms.").
70. The new standards drove many small farmers out of the market. Fuchs, Khalfagiannini &
Arendtsen, supra note 49, at 30. ("To stay competitive ... [farmers] have to supply large volumes
of food (and/or feed) per client and transaction.. . . [S]mallholder farmers with small economies
of scale, poor access to the market, and limited investments in inputs or infrastructure often are
squeezed out."); Fuchs & Kalfagianni, supra note 47, at 8 (Small South African farmers were
driven from the market); Campbell & Le Heron, supra note 55, at 142 (Small Australian produc-
ers consider EurepGAP to be a "large hurdle.").
71. For example, GlobalGap currently certifies 130,000 farms in 120 countries. The
GlobalG.A.P. Database, GLOBALG.A.P., http://www.globalgap.org/uk-en/what-we-do/the-gg-
system/GLOBALG.A.P.-Database/ (last visited May 15, 2014).
72. Some industry experts argue that retailers still prioritize price over safety and that en-
forcement is lax. Havinga, supra note 51, at 528-29.
73. See, e.g., Kathy Gordon, Tesco Sees Setback as UK Sales Slip, WALL ST. J. (June 5, 2015),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323844804578526511506702712 (discussing
Europe's recent horsemeat scandal).
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D. Rule by Technocrats: Fisheries
The dolphin and food safety standards were developed almost en-
tirely within industry. This made consensus relatively easy. Inviting
outside suppliers and activists to participate raises deeper challenges.
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) tried to limit controversy by
making as many value judgments as possible at the outset. After that,
implementation was supposed to be objective and politics-free.
History. Government diplomacy in the 1980s established broad
consensus around the concept of "sustainable fisheries" but produced
little in the way of practical implementation. This convinced many
NGOs to seek alternative strategies. 74 Meanwhile, the collapse of the
Grand Banks cod fishery provided a wakeup call for companies whose
asset value dependent on reliable fish supplies.75 In 1995, Unilever
invited the World Wild Life Federation (WWF) to discuss self-regula-
tion.76 Starting in September 1996, WWF and Unilever held a year-
long series of conferences to turn the official consensus into detailed
Principles that could be implemented by dispassionate experts.'77
These open discussions showed that the Principles were convincingly
mainstream.
MSC began operations as a fully independent entity in 1999.78 The
basic challenge was to persuade individual fisheries to invest the up to
$500,000 needed for certification to join the program.7 9 In practice,
74. Thomas Hale, Marine Stewardship Council, in HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERN-
ANCE: INSTITUTIONS AND INNOVATIONS 308, 309 (Thomas Hale & David Held eds., 2011)
("These regulations did not go far enough for private groups like WWF and Unilever.").
75. Rupert Howes, The Marine Stewardship Council Programme, in SEAFOOD ECOLABEL-
LING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 81, 83 (Trevor Ward & Bruce Philips eds., 2008). Prominent
scientific predictions that world fisheries would collapse by mid-century further persuaded
Unilever that sustainable fishing was needed to protect its asset value. Id. at 81.
76. Dave Wortman, Shop and Save, SIERRA MAG. (Nov./Dec. 2002), http://www.sierraclub.
org/sierra/20021l/ecolabels.asp.
77. The "Principles" were drafted at an experts' workshop in September 1996 and followed by
eight meetings where stakeholders around the world were invited to comment and suggest
changes. A second experts' workshop finalized the document in December 1997. Howes, supra
note 77, at 84; Hale, supra note 76, at 309. WWF and Unilever split FSC's $1 million-plus start-
up costs equally. Brendan May, Duncan Leadbitter & Michael Weber, The Marine Stewardship
Council (MSC), in ECOLABELLING IN FISHERIES: WHAT IS IT ALL ABOUT? 14 (Bruce Phillips,
Trevor Ward & Chet Chaffee eds., 2008). Participants included government scientists, activists,
marine conservationists, academics, and industry. No fishermen were consulted. See Wortman,
supra note 76.
78. UNILEVER CORP., FISHING FOR THE FUrrURE 11: UNILEVER'S FISH SUSTAINABILITY INITIA-
TIVE (FSI) 8 (2003).
79. May et al., supra note 77; Hale, supra note 74, at 311. For a slightly lower estimate see
Howes, supra note 75, at 88 (quoting certification fees ranging from $20,000 for small community
fisheries to "perhaps $200,000 to $300,000 for the largest fisheries"). The figure does not include
the cost of whatever new or additional practices are required for certification. For comparison,
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fisheries joined for two distinct reasons. First, some consumers were
willing to pay a sustainability premium for certain high-end species,
like salmon.80 By 2006, MSC had certified more than 42% of the
salmon worldwide catch,81 and salmon accounted for about 15% per-
cent of all MSC-certified seafood.
The second set of adoptions was driven by oligopoly competition.
Many consumers will cheerfully switch brands to buy sustainable
fish-but only if the price stays constant. This means that big fish
processors can use sustainability to grab market share from rivals, pro-
vided that they and/or their suppliers (a) earn above-normal, oligop-
oly profits, and (b) divert part of those profits to subsidize the higher
standard. This dynamic was particularly important in the oligopoly
market for fish sticks and other processed seafood made from so-
called "whitefish" species. Unilever's purchashing power in this mar-
ket gave it enormous leverage over suppliers. By 2006, MSC stan-
dards covered one-third (32%) of the world's whitefish production,8 2
and whitefish accounted for roughly three-quarters of all MSC-certi-
fied seafood. 3 Big fisheries similarly saw certification as a way of en-
couraging consumers to switch to new fish stocks including New
Zealand hoki, South African plaice, and Australian lobsters.8 4
Unilever's used its power shrewdly for maximum effect. Its imme-
diate demands were limited to insisting that its one hundred or so
long-term fish suppliers comply with local law and provide evidence
that they were "progressing" toward sustainability.85 By comparison,
its long-term goals depended on creating a competition to see which
suppliers could introduce sustainability the fastest. Unilever did this
obtaining a Clean Air Act permit from the U.S. EPA can cost up to $125,120 and take ten years.
Editorial, The 'Absurd Results' Power Grab, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2014).
80. Price premiums vary dramatically from species to species and are almost certainly strong-
est for specialty fish like salmon. Howes, supra note 75, at 87. Recent evidence suggests that
pollock can also earn a premium in some markets. Cathy A. Roheim, Frank Asche & Julie
Insignares Santos, The Elusive Price Premium for Ecolabelled Products: Evidence from Seafood
in the UK Market, 62 J. AGRIC. ECON. 655, 655-68 (2011) (reporting 14.2% premium in politi-
cally-correct London).
81. CONROY, supra note 45, at 216.
82. Id. The corresponding figure for non-whitefish was just six percent. Id.
83. Id.
84. UNILEVER CORP., supra note 78, at 10. Other fisheries tried to block this strategy by
certifying established species. Graeme Auld et al., Can Non-State Governance "Ratchet Up"
Global Standards? Assessing their Indirect Effects and Evolutionary Potential (prepared for the
2009 Am. Political Sci. Ass'n Annual Meeting), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=1450435 (Alaskan and Canadian salmon).
85. UNILEVER CORP., supra note 78, at 4, 6. Unilever increased this pressure in 1998 by prom-
ising to terminate any supplier that failed all five of its in-house sustainability criteria. Id. at 6.
By December 2002, Unilever bought "the bulk" of its fish from suppliers that the company's in-
house assessment tool rated "sustainable or well managed." Id. at 6, 8.
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by, inter alia, announcing a purchasing preference for MSC-certified
seafood; pressuring long-term suppliers to certify;86 and setting target
dates for transitioning the company to 100% sustainable products.87
By 2006, MSC had certified many of Unilever's biggest suppliers.88
Unilever's efforts were further amplified when retail oligopolists
like Sainsbury and Walmart8 9 suddenly found it easier to offer sustain-
able fish and promptly deployed sustainability as a weapon to defend
and expand their market shares. This pressure was further amplified
by economies of scale on the supply side as fishermen, wholesalers,
processors, and distributors found it cheaper to adopt the new stan-
dard for all purposes than to maintain redundant facilities for un-certi-
fied fish.90
Politics. MSC's fifteen-member Board exercises nearly complete
control over the documents that define certification, 91 the companies
that are allowed to perform certifications, and the fisheries that are
86. Id. at 4 (Unilever promised to "work closely" with suppliers to change fish stock manage-
ment and fisheries practices); Jim Gilmore, Case Study 3: MSC Certification of the Alaska Pol-
lock Fishery, in SEAFOOD ECOLABELLING, supra note 77, at 270 (describing Unilever discussions
with Alaska pollock fishery: "At the time, Unilever was one of the largest, if not the largest,
whitefish buyer in the world" and bought a large fraction of its needs from the Alaskan market.).
87. Rupert Howes, supra note 75, at 81, 95 (describing Walmart's 2006 promise to purchase all
wild-caught seafood from MSC-certified sources within five years); Id. at 95 (describing Marks &
Spencer's 2007 announcement that it would source all wild fish from certified sources by 2012);
UNILEVER CORP., supra note 78, at 4 (describing Unilever's 1996 promise to source all fish from
sustainable stocks by 2005); Alexia Cummins, The Marine Stewardship Council: A Multi-Stake-
holder Approach to Sustainable Fishing, 11 CORP. Soc. RESP. & ENvrL. MGMT. 85, 92-93 (2004)
(describing Sainsbury's 2003 promise to source all wild fish from sustainable stocks by 2010);
Jason LaChappelle, Landing the Big Fish: 5 Questions with MSC About the McDonald's USA
Announcement, ISEAL ALLIANCE (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.isealalliance.org/online-commu-
nity/blogs/landing-the-big-fish-5-questions-with-msc-about-the-mcdonald%E2%80%99s-usa-an-
nouncement (describing McDonalds' announcement of MSC-only fish policies in Europe (2011)
and U.S. (2013)).
88. Participating fisheries included Unilever's Alaskan Pollock, Chilean hake, South African
hake, and New Zealand hoki suppliers. UNILEVER CORP., supra note 78, at 4.
89. van der Kloet & Havinga, supra note 48, at 15 (listing supermarkets, fish restaurants, and
seafood retailers that "prefer to sell MSC labeled seafood"); CONROY, supra note 45, at 219
(Walmart "has notified all its seafood suppliers that it is seeking to purchase only MSC-certified
wild-caught fish."); Cummins, supra note 87, at 93 (discussing Sainsbury's commitment to "work
with their suppliers" to move toward sustainable fish); Howes, supra note 75, at 95 (describing
Walmart's promise to encourage suppliers to work with WWF and Conservation International to
develop sustainable practices); id. at 96 (Many UK retailers have announced a "'buyer prefer-
ence' for MSC-certified fish").
90. Howes, supra note 75, at 95 (predicting that Walmart's decision to favor certified fish
would have a "ripple effect ... across the whole marketplace"); UNILEVER CORP., supra note 80,
at 1 (Unilever gave suppliers "strong encouragement" to adopt suitable practices and work to-
ward certification.). The standard even survived Unilever's 2005 decision to sell its European
frozen food business. So far, the new owners have continued to demand MSC-endorsed fish.
CONROY, supra note 45, at 219.
91. Hale, supra note 74, at 312.
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certified. 92 Strikingly, MSC has resisted calls to make the Board more
democratic, arguing that this would "paralyse[ ]"decision-making and
force the Board to implement policies "it did not agree" with.93
Most MSC politics seems to revolve around the certification of indi-
vidual fisheries.94 While certifications are initially performed by
outside companies, final approval comes from the Board. In practice,
the Principles allow wide discretion. 95 Certification companies use
this freedom to engineer compromises that limit the total cost to fish-
erieS96 while simultaneously demanding enough reforms to satisfy the
NGOs. 9 7 Not surprisingly, this process is "highly politicized." 98 Fish-
erman charge that certifiers often make demands less from science
than to appease the NGOs.99
Groups that fail to get their way routinely threaten to leave MSC.100
This leverage is real: If enough NGOs leave, MSC's reputation with
consumers will collapse. But if the fisheries leave, MSC will have no
fish to certify. Given this balancing act, the Board's real power is
probably limited.101
Government Interactions. Practically all MSC fisheries are already
regulated by governments. This is almost certainly because unregu-
lated fisheries are too competitive to afford certification.10 2 MSC's
standards do, however, add an additional layer of regulation which
92. Howes, supra note 75, at 88.
93. May et al., supra note 77, at 33; but see Cummins, supra note 87, at 89-90.
94. The Board also manages amendments to the "Principles."
95. Certifiers must choose 80-100 unique "performance indicators" for each fishery. Cum-
mins, supra note 87, at 87. Even then, fishery science leaves room for a wide range of opinions.
May et al., supra note 77, at 20 ("[Tlhere is a huge diversity of strong opinions around as to what
is an acceptable consequence of fishing. Not all of these opinions are free from self-interest.").
96. Fisheries typically interview several certification companies before selecting one. The in-
terviews feature detailed discussions about what reforms will be needed, the chances of success-
ful certification, and expected fees. Howes, supra note 75, at 88. The fact that fisheries tend to
make the biggest upgrades after preassessment but before certification suggests that certifiers
honor these promises. Id.
97. Gilmore, supra note 86, at 278.
98. Cummins, supra note 87, at 88.
99. Certifiers may have deliberately manipulated scores so that they could order "additional,
time-consuming steps to placate" NGOs. Gilmore, supra note 86, at 277.
100. May et al., supra note 77, at 24 ("Every certification to date has been subject to com-
ments typified by 'We support certification but not for this fishery' and 'If this fishery is not
certified then the MSC is doomed."').
101. To the extent that any discretion remains, board members presumably decide based on
their norms, ethics, and and ideology.
102. MSC certification has worked poorly in fisheries that lack quotas or operate in unregu-
lated waters. Lars H. Gulbrandsen, The Emergence and Effectiveness of the Marine Stewardship
Council, 33 MARINE POL'Y 654, 658 (2009).
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lets foreign governments and NGOs influence fisheries103 subject to
pushback from local officials.10 4
Results. By 2012, MSC had certified more than one hundred fisher-
ies and another hundred were undergoing assessment.10 5 This gave
MSC power over extensive resources including Alaskan pollock (one-
third of total U.S. seafood production)106 and hake (South Africa's
most valuable fishery). 07 The extent to which MSC has actually used
this power to improve fishery practices is less clear, especially since
most fisheries seeking certification have high standards already.108
Despite this, certification has probably produced modest increases in
sustainability.109 Meanwhile, certification remains confined to fisher-
ies in the developed worldo with almost no penetration of the Asian
markets that consume two-thirds of the world's seafood."' MSC's
stated goal of becoming a universal fishing standard is unlikely to hap-
pen any time soon.
E. A Private Legislature: Coffee
MSC tried and failed to suppress politics. But if politics cannot be
eliminated, it should at least be domesticated. The coffee industry has
103. In 2005, the Nordic countries urged the UN's Food and Agricultural Organization to
create its own non-binding labeling scheme. MSC restructured itself to help implement the sys-
tem. Id. at 655; see also FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GUIDELINES FOR THE
ECOLABELLING OF FISH AND FISHERY PRODUCTS FROM MARINE CAPTURE
FISHERIES 131-50 (2009).
104. May et al., supra note 77, at 24 (describing U.S. federal fishery managers' anger at
"overly critical assessment report" and how MSC "sought an audience to calm the waters").
105. List of All Certified Fisheries, MSC, http://www.msc.org/track-a-fishery/fisheries-in-the-
program/certified/all-certified-fisheries (last visited May 21, 2014).
106. Howes, supra note 75, at 85; UNILEVER CORP., supra note 78, at 11.
107. UNILEVER CORP., supra note 78, at 11.
108. Gilmore, supra note 86, at 277 ("Pollock was already one of the world's best fisheries,
and indeed this is why it chose to apply for MSC"). There is also evidence that joining MSC
discourages post-certification reforms. Simon R. Bush, Hilde Toonen, Peter Oosterveer & Ar-
thur P.J. Mol, The 'Devils Triangle' of MSC Certification: Balancing Credibility, Accessibility and
Continuous Improvement, 37 MARINE POLIcy 288, 289 (2012) (WWF refused to license its panda
logo to fishermen who claimed to follow higher standards than MSC.); Gilmore, supra note 86,
at 272 (Alaska Pollock fisheries pursued MSC certification as a hedge against NGO and U.S.
government pressure.); Trevor J. Ward, Measuring the Success of Seafood Ecolabelling, in SEA-
FOOD ECOLABELLING, supra note 75, at 217-18 (Australian fishermen cited MFC approval as
evidence that further reforms were unnecessary.).
109. Hale, supra note 74, at 312-13; Howes, supra note 75, at 94 (MSC reforms in South
Georgia Chilean sea bass fishery included putting "independent observers on each boat, closing
the fishing grounds for half of the year and requiring lines to be set at night to reduce bird
bycatch.").
110. Gulbrandsen, supra note 102, at 658.
111. Hale, supra note 74, at 313. As of 2010, MSC had certified just three developing world
fisheries. Id.
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developed elaborate insititutions to make private politics fairer and
more predictable.
History. U.S. diplomats organized coffee cartels to maintain Latin
America's political stability throughout World War II and the Cold
War. 112 However, the agreements quickly collapsed after the fall of
Communism in 1989. Coffee prices fell forty percent over the next
five years and have remained volatile ever since." 3 The crisis impov-
erished farmers, suppressed investment, and threatened the long-run
viability of coffee supplies.114
NGOs organized various labeling initiatives to address the crisis in
1995-1997."5 However, all of these standards focused on the ten per-
cent or so of suppliers who sell to specialty stores like Starbucks.116
This was the only segment of the market where consumers are willing
to pay a premium for sustainability." 7
By the early 2000s, a second "coffee crisis" was in the offing and
producer income had fallen to a thirty-year low."" The German Fed-
eral Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (DMZ)119
responded by organizing discussions with industry and NGOs in
2001.120 This led to proposals for a mainstream standard that would
cover the coffee sold in supermarkets, restaurants, and institutions.12 1
112. INT'L COFFEE ORG., THE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE ORGANIZATION 1963-2013: 50 YEARS
SERVING THE WORLD COFFEE COMMUNITY 3 (2013). European governments joined the scheme
in 1962. Id. at 39.
113. Id. at 13.
114. Petra Kuenkel et al., Partnerships for Sustainability Case Study The Common Code for
the Coffee Community (4C) (June 26, 2008) (draft for the National Acadamies Policy and
Global Affairs Division), available at http://www.nap.edulopenbook.php?recordid=12541&
page=85. Large coffee companies also worried that volatile prices would encourage rich nation
consumers to try new beverages. Id.
115. The main examples were Fairtrade, Organic, Rainforest Alliance, and Utz Certified.
Graeme Auld et al., Can Technological Innovations Improve Private Regulation in the Global
Economy?, Bus. & POL., Oct. 2010, at 13-14; Ans Kolk, Mainstreaming Sustainable Coffee, 21
SUSTAINABLE DEv. 324, 325 (2013).
116. 4C Ass'N, ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2007), available at http://www.4c-coffeeassociation.org/
uploads/media/4C Annual-Report 2007.pdf.
117. Starbucks successfully introduced Fair Trade Certified coffee despite higher prices. CON.
ROY, supra note 45, at 2.
118. 4C Ass'N, ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2010), available at http://www.4c-coffeeassociation.org/up
loads/media/4CAnnualReport2OlOweb-en.pdf?PHPSESSID=9edcsuk5rqnne8e85lk95vlcn3;
Kuenkel et al., supra note 114.
119. Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit.
120. Much of the actual work was done by the German Government's Bundesministerium fir
Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) as implementation body. 4C Ass'N
supra note 116, at 4. I ignore this distinction in what follows.
121. See Kuenkel et al., supra note 114.
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Goals included raising green coffee prices, 122 reducing the risk of
scandal, 123 and eliminating overlapping certification requirements. 124
The fact that the talks included Kraft, Nestle, Sara Lee, and
Tschibo-which collectively accounted for forty percent of all world-
wide salesl25-gave the project significant leverage over suppliers. At
the same time, only one in twenty customers was prepared to switch
brands over social or environmental issues, even when prices stayed
constant.126 Furthermore, most of these consumers were located in
Europe, which accounts for just thirty percent of the worldwide
purchases. 127
By mid-2002, the discussions had expanded to include several large
supplier organizations and NGOs.128 In January 2003, the German
Coffee Association (DKV) partnered with BMZ12 9 to pursue agree-
ment around a "Common Code for the Coffee Community" that
would set baseline standards for suppliers.o30 Despite widespread
skepticism, most of the thirty-five big coffee companies, producers,
and NGOs invited to the kickoff meeting agreed to join a Steering
Committee.' 3' Drafting proceeded by consensus,132 forcing dissenters
122. Id.
123. Marianne Beisheim & Christopher Kaan, Transnational Standard-Setting Partnerships in
the Field of Social Rights:The Interplay of Legitimacy, Institutional Designs, and Process Manage-
ment, in DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 122,
131-32 (Magdalena Bexell & Ulrika Morth eds., 2010) (Large companies worried that their
"credibility ... would be put at risk if, for example, one of their suppliers ... did not comply.").
124. Standard Setting Organizations, 4C Ass'N, http://www.4c-coffeeassociation.orgbecome-a-
member/membership-benefits/standard-setting-organizations.html#2 (last visited May 21, 2014)
("More and more producer organizations, companies and development agencies in the coffee
sector are requesting that standard setting organizations cooperate to avoid duplication of ef-
forts."); Ans Kolk, Towards a Sustainable Coffee Market: Paradoxes Faced by a Multinational
Company, 19 CORP. Soc. RESP. ENVTL. MGMT., 79, 82 (2012); 4C Ass'N, supra note 118 at 4
(Compatible standards let companies blend coffee from different sources to achieve whatever
average sustainability level best fit their marketing needs).
125. As of 2005, Nestle and Kraft each had a 13% share of the market. Sara Lee and Dowe
Egberts each had 10% shares while Proctor & Gamble had a 4% share. Ans Kolk, Corporate
Social Responsibility in the Coffee Sector: The Dynamics of MNC Responses and Code Develop-
ment, 23 EUR. MGMT. J. 228, 229 (2005).
126. Kolk, supra note 124, at 81.
127. Kolk, supra note 115, at 334.
128. Kuenkel et al., supra note 114. The world's fifth biggest roaster, U.S.-based Smuckers,
never joined. Smuckers accounts for roughly one-tenth of worldwide green coffee purchases.
Specialty outlets operating their own in-house standards also declined to join. Kolk, supra note
115, at 333
129. Kuenkel et al., supra note 114. The German Coffee Association (DKV) and German
governmment (BMZ) each contributed C500,000 to the project.
130. Id.
131. Founding members included Kraft, Sara Lee, Tschibo, Nestle, Oxfam, Rainforest Alli-
ance, Utz Kapeh, the Flanders International Cooperation Agency, and the German Ministry for
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to choose between agreeing and walking away. The Code was an-
nounced in September 2004.133
The project was renewed and expanded in 2005.134 This second
phase focused on negotiating a constitution that would create a new
body ("4C") to administer the Code. 35 Once again, drafting pro-
ceeded by consensus.136 Suppliers were suspicious of the big roasters
and only joined after being promised more votes than any other
group. 37 Final agreement came through a series of "We'll join if
you'll join" negotiations in late 2006.138 In April 2007, a "Who's
Who" of seventy-one European Coffee manufacturers, trade associa-
tions, and producer organizations met for 4C's First General Assem-
bly where they voted to adopt by-laws and elect a governing
council. 139
The first 4C coffee went on sale in October 2007.140 By 2010, about
8% of all coffee exports belonged to 4C or an affiliated standard.141
However, demand failed to keep up. By 2009, the supply of 4C coffee
was twenty times larger than actual purchases,142 and 4C coffee prices
were the same as uncertified coffee.143 Although 4C mounted initia-
tives to fix the problem,144 supply was still more than twice actual
Technical Cooperation. Organizers continued to recruit new Steering Committee members
throughout the negotiations. For a complete list see Kuenkel et al., supra note 114.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (New partners included The European Coffee Federation, the British Development
Corporation, and the Swiss State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs). The European Coffee Federa-
tion, BMZ, and the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs each provided C500,000 to
finance the project. Kuenkel et al., supra note 114. Additional sums were donated by the Flan-
ders International Cooperation Agency. 4C Ass'N, supra note 116, at 22.
135. Kuenkel et al., supra note 114; 4C Ass'N, supra note 116, at 4.
136. Kuenkel et al., supra note 114.
137. Id.
138. 4C Ass'N, supra note 116, at 2-4; Auld et al., supra note 115, at 13-14; Kuenkel et al.,
supra note 114.
139. 4C Ass'N, supra note 116, at 2, 6.
140. Id. at 2; Kuenkel et al., supra note 114.
141. 4C Ass'N, supra note 118, at 4; 4C Ass'N, supra note 116, at 12; Graeme Auld, Assessing
Certification as Governance: Effects and Broader Consequences for Coffee, 19 J. ENV'T & DEV.
216, 220 (2010) (4C certifies 6% of world crop; the next largest standards are IFOAM (1.2%)
and Fair Trade (0.9%).).
142. 4C Ass'N, ANNUAL REPORT 25 (2009), available at http://www.4c-coffeeassociation.org/
uploads/media/4C AnnualReport2009_web_1r_en.pdf. The situation was only slightly better for
specialty coffees. In 2006, Fairtrade producers sold just 10-20% of their output as certified; the
rest was sold at regular market prices. Kolk, supra note 115, at 329 n.2. See also, Kolk, supra
note 125.
143. See Kolk, supra note 125.
144. 4C Ass'N, supra note 142, at 7 ("The Strategic Plan 2015 defines clear activities and
measures to better balance supply and demand in the medium-term").
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purchases in 2010 and 2011.145 4C announced that it was reorganizing
itself around a new, demand-oriented business plan in 2011.146
Institutions. 4C's General Assembly includes all of the organiza-
tion's members and is divided into separate chambers for producers,
industry, and NGOs. Each chamber must separately approve all ma-
jor policy initiatives including amendments to the 4C Code.147 The
Assembly also elects a Governing Council composed of seven produc-
ers, five industry representatives, and five NGOs.148 The Council is
responsible for policy direction.149 A professional staff ("Project Sec-
retariat")150 generates documents, schedules meetings, and hires ex-
perts. 151 It focuses on overcoming frictions so that 4C members can
reach agreement but refuses to take sides on substance.
As in our food example, the big processors have given suppliers and
NGOs an equal voice in designing the 4G standard. In return, suppli-
ers have provided ideas for making the standard more cost-effective152
while NGO participation has helped to insulate 4C from criticism. 53
Politics. All 4C members support higher prices for green coffee.15 4
Unlike suppliers and NGOs, however, the big coffee manufacturers
insist that any "major price increases" be matched by quality in-
creases.155 This probably reflects concerns that producers could de-
145. Supply stood at 14% while demand was just 6%, of which 4C supplied just 2%. Kolk,
supra note 115, at 329-30. The supply figure is only a "guesstimate" and the true figure may be
lower. Id.
146. 4C Ass'N, supra note 118, at 1, 2 (4C was reorganized around a new "demand driven"
business model in February 2011); 4C Ass'N, ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2008), available at http://www.
4c-coffeeassociation.org/uploads/media/4C-Annual-Report-2008_en_1r.pdf (4C's roaster mem-
bers committed to buying more coffee from verified producers over time and reporting
purchases annually.).
147. Kuenkel et al., supra note 114.
148. 4C Ass'N, supra note 118, at 6; Kuenkel et al., supra note 114.
149. 4C Ass'N, supra note 142, at 8.
150. Kuenkel et al., supra note 114.
151. Id.
152. Kuenkel et al., supra note 114 ("Many standards so far, have been developed by experts
with little or no input from those who are intended to comply with the standards.").
153. Id. NGOs worried that working with business would offend their constituencies or un-
dermine demand for existing specialty coffee standards. Id.
154. 4C Ass'N, supra note 146, at 10 (Producer demand for higher prices); Kolk, supra note
125 (Big corporations agreed on the need for high, stable green coffee prices); Kuenkel et al.,
supra note 114 (Government saw 4C as a replacement for Cold-War era price agreements and a
way for private money to improve production, "a role that national governments often did not
provide"). The parties also agreed on various subsidiary goals, including initiatives to reduce
duplication in existing standards and provide direct services for improving suppliers' production
methods. 4C Ass'N, supra note 146, at 10; Kuenkel et al., supra note 114.
155. Kolk, supra note 124, at 84 (Statements by strongly pro-standards roaster Sara Lee).
320 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 12:297
cide to pocket higher profits without investing in better infrastructure,
working conditions, and environmental practices. 156
As in our fishing example, the negotiations that produced 4C's
Code and governance documents featured "many conflicts" with "al-
most every stakeholder group threatening to leave . . . at some
point."1 57 This ultimately resulted in an implicit bargain whereby sup-
pliers that invested in improved practices would receive higher prices
from roasters.158 The problem, so far, is that the big European roast-
ers have failed to deliver. As of 2012, 4C members only filled about
six percent of their needs with 4C or 4C-compatible coffee. 159 Instead
of receiving higher coffee prices, suppliers ended up making the re-
quested improvements at their own expense-the direct opposite of
the intended bargain.
Interactions with Government. Organizers originally wanted to
launch 4C as a public body but were blocked by producer nations. 160
Since then, officials have taken a neutral position, 161 trusting in 4C
members' self-interest to raise prices and improve infrastructure. 4C
continues to work closely with the ICO.162
Results. The current 4C Steering Committee members plus their de
facto ally Sara Leel 63 buy roughly 80% of all certified coffee pur-
chased worldwide. 164 This economic muscle allowed 4C to set work-
ing conditions for hundreds of thousands of workers around the
156. Id. Company attitudes also depended on the countries where they operated. Kolk, supra
note 115, at 327. Many multinationals prefer a low standard that lets them market differently in
different countries. Kolk, supra note 124, at 79-89.
157. Id. (describing negotiations that led to 4C's Code and governance documents). Individ-
ual threats came from Oxfam, Greenpeace, and Food First Informations-und-Aktions-Netzwork.
Id. Greenpeace and Food First subsequently carried out their threats. Id.
158. Kuenkel et al., supra note 114; see also 4C Ass'N, supra note 142, at 5 (4C's roaster
members commit to buying increasing amounts of coffee from verified producers over time and
reporting their purchases annually).
159. In 2008, Starbucks purchased 77% of its needs from certified sources. Among main-
stream companies, Tschibo was the highest at 6.2%. Kolk, supra note 115, at 332.
160. Kuenkel et al., supra note 114 (describing early plans to house 4C within the ICO); Auld,
supra note 141, at 221.
161. Government staff seconded to the 4C Secretariat were told to pursue whatever areas of
agreement existed while maintaining a neutral position on content. See Kuenkel et al., supra
note 114; see also Beisheim & Kaan, supra note 125.
162. Auld et al., supra note 84; Auld, supra note 141, at 229. (4C "has been engaged in dia-
logue with ICO to determine what role it might play in implementing the 2007 ICA"); Kuenkel
et al., supra note 114 (4C Board includes an ICO representative).
163. Sara Lee left 4C in 2008 but remains a de facto ally through its close association with the
4C-compatible Utz Kapeh standard.
164. Kolk, supra note 124, at 84 (Table 2; 78-82% estimate).
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world.165 This includes requiring producers to immediately ban ten
"Unacceptable Practices" and make steady improvements on an addi-
tional twenty-eight "noncompliance with sustainability" issues. 166
Despite these achievements, only about ten percent of the world's
suppliers have so-far adopted 4C or a 4C-compatible standard.167 The
basic problem is that the big coffee companies do not buy nearly
enough certified coffee. Indeed, compliance could even decline since
it is hard to see why producers should go on supporting a standard
that earns no revenue. One obvious solution would be for 4C to de-
velop a new and more stringent standard. This would simultaneously
reduce the current over-production of 4C coffee while increasing con-
sumer demand.
F. Politics as Standards War: Forestry
We have seen that private politics often includes walkout threats.
To be credible, these must occasionally be carried out. This opens the
door to multiple competing standards. Private forestry standards have
followed this pattern since the 1990s.
History. Tropical deforestation became a prominent issue in the
1980s.168 But while rich nation diplomats were able to build consensus
around "sustainable forestry," efforts to implement the concept as an
enforceable treaty collapsed in 1992.169 At this point, the World Wild-
life Fund persuaded NGOs, small timber producers, and high-end fur-
nituremakers to organize a private standard. 170 The new Forest
165. 4C Ass'N, supra note 142, at 2 (stating that 4C standards set working conditions for
240,000 workers in twenty countries.)
166. 4C Ass'N, supra note 142, at 6; Standard Setting Organizations, supra note 127.
167. This success is partly due to low certification costs: Unlike MSC, 4C pays for verification
and programs that teach farmers how to improve their methods. Kuenkel et al., supra note 114;
Auld, supra note 141, at 221.
168. DAVID HUMPHREYS, FOREST POLITICS: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERA-
TION 1 (1996).
169. Auld et al., supra note 115, at 11; Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, Nonstate
Global Governance: Is Forest Certification a Legitimate Alternative to a Global Forest Conven-
tion?, in HARD CHOICES, Sor LAw: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRON-
MENT, AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 33, 47 (John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2004);
Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: the Case of For-
estry, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 47, 50 (2006).
170. Meidinger, supra note 169, at 51. Other players included The Woodworkers Alliance for
Rain Forest Protection, the Rain Forest Alliance, and British do-it-yourself retailer B&Q. See
generally Graeme Auld et al., Perspectives on Forest Certification: A Survey Examining Differ-
ences Among the US Forest Sectors' Views of their Forest Certification Alternatives, in FOREST
POLICY FOR PRIVATE FORESTRY 271, 272 (L. D. Teeter, Ben Cashore, & D. Zhang, eds., 2002);
CONROY, supra note 45, at 244; ITS GLOBAL, FOREST CERTIFICATION - SUSTAINABILITY, GOV-
ERNANCE, AND RISK 21 (2011), available at http://www.itsglobal.net/sites/default/files/itsgloball
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Stewardship Council (FSC) interpreted the official consensus liberally
to include ambitious biodiversity, ecology, and social justice goals.171
FSC saw private enterprise as obstructionist and adopted govern-
ance rules that deliberately reduced business members' ability to in-
fluence policy.1 72 Instead, it hoped that activist pressure would
persuade big retailers to demand FSC compliance from their suppli-
ers. The ensuing campaign included more than 600 demonstrations at
Home Depot stores. 73 Home Depot resolved the dispute in 1999 by
agreeing to terminate vendors who violated local law 74 and promising
to end purchases from endangered regions by 2003.17s It also en-
couraged its suppliers to compete on sustainability. Specific tactics
included announcing a purchasing preference for FSC when price and
quality are similar,176 pressing suppliers to adopt FSC,177 and adopting
a long term "intention" to purchase all wood products "following
rules that only FSC currently meets." 78 Similar concessions were
promptly adopted by home improvement chains across the U.S. and
Europe.179 This persuaded many suppliers that it was cheaper to
adopt FSC for all purposes than to maintain redundant systems.180 In-
Forestry%20Certification-Sustainability%20Governance%20and%20Risk%20%282011 %29.pdf
[hereinafter FOREST CERTIFICATION].
171. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, FSC INTERNATIONAL STANDARD: FSC PRINCIPLES AND
CRITERIA FOR FOREST STEWARDSHIP 7 (2012), available at https://ic.fsc.org/download.fsc-std-01-
001-v5-0-revised-principles-and-criteria-for-forest-stewardship.a-1780.pdf [hereinafter FSC IN-
TERNATIONAL]; Meidinger, supra note 169, at 79 (describing FSC's "expansive vision" of a "just
forest").
172. See, e.g., Auld et al., supra note 170, at 272 (FSC's governance structure was deliberately
designed to "eliminat[e] business dominance" over standards); Bernstein & Cashore, supra note
169, at 39 (FSC voting is structured so that business occupies a permanent minority).
173. Erika N. Sasser, Gaining Leverage: NGO Influence on Certification Institutions in the
Forest Products Sector, in FOREST POLICY FOR PRIVATE FORESTRY 229, 240 (L. D. Teeter, Ben
Cashore, & D Zhang, eds., 2002).
174. Wood Purchasing Policy, HOME DEPOT, https://corporate.homedepot.com/CorporateRe-
sponsibility/EnvironmentfWoodPurchasing/Pages/default.aspx (last visited May 22, 2014).
175. Frequently Asked Questions, HOME DEPOT, https://corporate.homedepot.com/Corporate
Responsibility/Environment/WoodPurchasing/Pages/FAQs.aspx (last visited May 22, 2014);
Press Release, Home Depot, The Home Depot Introduces Eco Options (Apr. 17, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.newswire.calen/story/84479/the-home-depot-introduces-eco-options.
176. Meidinger, supra note 169, at 57-8; Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 178; Wood
Purchasing Policy, supra note 177 (promising "preferential treatment" for certified products and
companies that practice responsible forestry).
177. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 175; Wood Purchasing Policy, supra note 177;
Meidinger, supra note 169, at 58; Press Release, supra note 175.
178. Auld et al., supra note 170, at 273.
179. Meidinger, supra note 169, at 58 (Lowes in the U.S.; Homebase, B&Q, Sainsbury in the
UK; Kingfisher in Europe and Asia); Bernstein & Cashmore, supra note 169, at 51 (describing
initial FSC support from "B&Q, Sainsbury, Centex, and German publishing companies").
180. ALAN PURBAWIYTNA & MARKKU SIMULA, INT'L TROPICAL TIMBER ORG., DEVELOPING
FOREST CERTIFICATION: TOWARDS INCREASING THE COMPARABILITY AND ACCEPTANCE OF
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dividual players in the homebuilding, publishing, and furnituremaking
also adopted the standard.181 Altogether, roughly one-fourth of the
U.S. market seems to have expressed a purchasing preference for
FSC.182
The suppliers fought back by creating their own Sustainable Forests
Initiative (SFI) in 1994.183 Unlike FSC, SFI interprets the "sustaina-
ble forestry" concept in a way that lets members adjust their goals to
local conditions.184 This does not make the standard trivial: At least
fifteen members resigned from the American Forest & Paper Associa-
tion rather than adopt the standard. 85 By 1999 SFI included more
than 85% of U.S. paper production.186 It also covered more than 90%
of the forests owned by large timber companies, although the "vast
majority" of privately owned forests remain uncertified. 87
In 1999, small European suppliers organized a Pan-European Forest
Certification Council (PEFC) to recognize each others' standards.188
They, too, argued that sustainability goals should depend on local con-
FOREST CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS WORLDWIDE 83 (Stocking different certification standards "is
costly and sometimes physically impossible due to a lack of space"); see also Mayer & Gereffi,
supra note 15, at 9-10 (Adopting uniform standards reduces social costs); CONROY, supra note
45, at 244 (describing Anderson Windows' decision to adopt FSC).
181. See Bernstein & Cashmore, supra note 169, at 51 (naming German publishing companies
that adopted FSC's standards); Sasser, supra note 173, at 237 (naming selected U.S. and Nether-
land publishers that adopted FSC's standards); PURBAWIYATNA & SIMULA, supra note 180, at 80
(noting that Kingfisher, IKEA, WalMart, and Home Depot all require their suppliers to provide
FSC or equivalently certified products).
182. Sasser, supra note 173, at 241.
183. See Meidinger, supra note 169, at 54; PETER SPRANG & NILS MEYER-OHLENDORF, Eco-
LOGIC, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND FOREST CERTIFICATION: ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR POLICY, LAW AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 12 (2006) (SFI was founded and became opera-
tional in 1995). The standard was originally written as a public relations exercise. Meidinger,
supra note 169, at 67-68 (Staff members drafted initial standard in consultation with member
companies and focus groups).
184. Scott Berg & Rick Cantrell, Sustainable Forestry Initiative: Toward a Higher Standard, 97
J. FORESTRY 33, 34-35 (1999) (SF1 "is the US forest and paper industry's response to the chal-
lenge of working toward the goal of sustainable forest management articulated at the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) Earth Summit in 1992.").
See SPRANG & MEYER-OHLENDORF, supra note 183, at 13-15 (providing a comparison of the
FSC and SFI).
185. Berg & Cantrell, supra note 184, at 33 ("15 forest products companies were asked to
leave the association .... ); Roger Brown & Daowei Zhang, The Sustainable Forestry Initiative's
Impact on Stumpage Markets in the US South, 35 CAN. J. FOR. REs. 2056, 2056 (2005) ("The
AF&PA has asked as many as 17 forest product companies not to renew their membership
. . . ."); CONROY, supra note 45, at 244 ("10 of [the trade association's] 250 members withdrew
from the association immediately and another 15 were dismissed .....
186. Brown & Zhang, supra note 185, at 2056.
187. Id. at 2056-57; Wortman, supra note 76.
188. FOREST CERTIFICATION, supra note 170, at 5, 11.
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ditionsl 89 and be affordable for small forests.190 PEFC endorsed its
first national scheme in 2000191 and began certifying non-European
forests in 2003.192 SFI joined in 2005.193 By then, PEFC standards
covered nearly twice as much acreage as FSC.194 Many retailers be-
gan purchasing wood interchangeably from FSC and PEFC.195
Politics. FSC and the PEFC are both governed by General Assem-
blies1 96 that approve all changes to basic documents and policy.1 97
However, the memberships are different. Most PEFC members are
national standard-setting bodies created by long-established forestry
associations. This creates a rough equality so that PEFC is able to
operate on a one country, one vote basis.198
By comparison, FSC is open to any individual or group that sub-
scribes to the organization's goals. This makes a one member, one
vote principle hard to justify. Instead, FSC follows a corporatist
model in which action must be separately approved by economic, so-
cial, and environmental sub-chambers.199 These are further subdi-
vided by North and South so that there are six bodies in all.200 The
sub-chambers, in turn, act by "consensus," which is defined to include
"the absence of sustained opposition" over "substantial issues" by
189. Id. at 11.
190. Id.; see also What Makes PEFC Unique, PEFC UK LIMITED, http://pefc.co.uk/about-pefc/
what-makes-pefc-unique (last visited May 22, 2014) (PEFC "is tailored to the specific needs of
family-and community-owned forests" which lack the economies of scale to finance FSC
certification).
191. FOREST CERTIFICATION, supra note 170, at 11.
192. Meidinger, supra note 169, at 56. PEFC has since re-branded itself as "The Programme
for the Endorsement of Forest Certification." It currently endorses standards in 30 countries.
Ingrid J. Visseren-Hamakers & Pieter Glasbergen, Partnerships in Forest Governance, 17
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 408, 411-12 (2006); About PEFC UK, PEFC UK LIMITED, http://
pefc.co.uk/about-pefc/about-pefc-uk (last visited May 22, 2014).
193. SFI Inc. - International Acceptance Through PEFC, SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE
1 (2009), available at http://www.sfiprogram.org/files/pdf/pefc-international-2009-02pdf.
194. FRIEDERIKE MECHEL ET AL., PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND FOREST CERTIFICATION: As-
SESSING THE IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY, LAW AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 41-42 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.ecologic.eu/sites/files/project/2013/933_finalreport.pdf.
195. Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 169, at 40.
196. FOREST CERTIFICATION, supra note 170, at 12, 20; see e.g., FSC General Assembly, FSC,
http://www.ga.fsc.org/generalassembly.html (last visited May 22, 2014); see also, Meidinger,
supra note 169, at 53-54. Approximately two-thirds of the members are organizations; the rest
are individuals. Meidinger, supra note 169, at 54.
197. Tony Rotherham, Forest Management Certifictation Around the World - Progress and
Problems, 87 FORESTRY CHRON. 603, 605; FSC INTERNATIONAL, supra note 171, at 5.
198. See, e.g., FOREST CERTIFICATION, supra note 170, at 12, 20; Meidinger, supra note 169, at
54.
199. FOREST CERTIFICATION, supra note 170, at 12, 20; see also Meidinger, supra note 169, at
54. Business originally possessed fewer votes and board members than other chambers. Id. at 53
& n.30.
200. Meidinger, supra note 169, at 53.
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"any important part" of "the concerned interests." 201 As a practical
matter, the meaning of "consensus" is set by the need to keep dozens
of competing interest groups within FSC's coalition.202 FSC's recent
decision to approve new Principles based on a 75% majority illus-
trates how the rule works in practice.203
FSC uses ad hoc groups to turn its Principles into specific national
and regional standards.204 At least half of each national group must
be drawn from FSC members "in a balanced way." 205 Like FSC itself,
the groups depend on "consensus." As a practical matter, this is de-
fined by members' willingness to walk out on the process.206 By com-
parison, PEFC sees itself as a bottom-up organization. This means
that national bodies are free to organize any way they choose and
need not reserve places for specific stakeholders.207 Despite this,
member bodies are sufficiently diverse that their politics frequently
revolves around walkout threats. 208
Standards Wars. The political fights within FSC and PEFC are only
half the story. This is because the two standards must also compete
with each other to attract consumers and producers. In practice,
201. Id. at 69. FSC's voting rules codify the consensus principle by guaranteeing that none of
the three stakeholder groups can be outvoted. This is qualified by other rules that specify "no
chamber shall show sustained opposition." MECHEL ET AL., supra note 194, at 43; cf Visseren-
Hamakers & Glasbergen, supra note 192, at 412.
202. These interest groups include: NGOs, indigenous people, and unions in the social cham-
ber; NGOs and academic institutions in the environmental chamber; and trade associations, pri-
vate forest owners, employees, certification bodies, and consultants in the economic chamber.
See PURBAWIYATNA & SIMULA, supra note 180, at 43
203. FSC INTERNATIONAL, supra note 171, at 3.
204. Rotherham, supra note 197, at 604. PEFC is based on mutual recognition by national
forest systems that "promote high standards of SFM." PURBAWIYATNA & SIMULA, supra note
180, at 45; UNITED NATIONS ECON. COMM'N FOR EUR., FOREST PRODUCTs ANNUAL MARKET
REVIEw 2011-2012 113 (2012), available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/timber/publi-
cations/FPAMR_2012.pdf [hereinafter UNECE].
205. PURBAWIYATNA & SIMULA, supra note 180, at 40 (At least half of each group must be
FSC members selected to represent the various chambers "in a balanced way.").
206. See Meidinger, supra note 169, at 69. One early FSC working group even approved a
standard after all of its industry members had walked out. Id. The incident reportedly caused
"consternation" and a new "understanding" that industry acceptance of standards "is expected."
Id.
207. FOREST CERTIFICATION, supra note 170, at 20. PEFC does not reserve places for particu-
lar stakeholders. Id. at 11, 21.
208. FORESTETHICS, SFl: Certified GreenWash: Inside the Sustainable Forest Initiative's De-
ceptive Eco-Label 4 (2010), available at http://forestethics.org//sites/forestethics.huang.radicalde-
signs.org/files/SFI-Certified-Greenwash-Report-ForestEthics.pdf (describing moderate
ecologist's resignation from SF1 board); Meidinger, supra note 169, at 57 (describing NatureCon-
servancy's resignation from SFI board).
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changes in one standard often elicit countermoves from the other.209
The result has been a Silicon Valley-style standards war in which each
side seeks to attract more retailers and suppliers than the other. Pre-
dictably, this competition has encouraged both standards to converge
over time. Most of the changes on PEFC/SFI's side have been de-
signed to reassure the public (and indirectly, retailers) that its stan-
dards are credible. This has led to various upgrades, such as giving
non-AF&PA members more power, strengthening compliance au-
dits,210 and banning certain practices outright.211 PEFC and SFI have
also adopted FSC-style protections for workers, indigenous peoples,
and local communities. 212 Conversely, FSC has become more sup-
plier-friendly. Changes include letting producers mix certified and un-
certified wood,213 and relaxing certain rules for "small and low
intensity" forests. 214 FSC has also considered establishing local excep-
tions for Canadian, Russian, and tropical suppliers215 that would al-
most certainly reduce safety.2 16
209. Meidinger, supra note 169, at 56, 78; see also Interview with Ben Gunneberg, Gen. Sec'y,
PEFC (2004), available at http://www.forest.It/pefc.StraipsniiLT/Press/Ben%20Gunneberg-apie
%20PEFC.doc (FSC and PEFC group compete but also influence each other).
210. Meidinger, supra note 169, at 55 (describing how AF&PA responded to activist critics by
making SFI independent and creating a multi-stakeholder board of directors); Brown & Zhang,
supra note 185, at 2056 (describing how SFI created an MSC-style expert advisory board to
recommend improvements to existing standards); Meidinger, supra note 169, at 67, 82 (describ-
ing how SFI added notice-and-comment requirements to rule-making); Berg & Cantrell, supra
note 184, at 33-34 (describing how SFI introduced mandatory audits for members who use its
logo on packaging); UNECE, supra note 204, at 115 (describing how SFI implemented FSC-style
chain-of custody procedures so that certified wood can be tracked from forest to store); MECHEL
ET AL., supra note 194, at 10-12 (describing how FSC introduced detailed "chain of custody"
procedures and required public disclosure of audit results).
211. MECHEL ET AL., supra note 194, at 48-49 (describing how individual PEFC national bod-
ies authorized old growth logging and use of genetically modified organisms); Rotherham, supra
note 200, at 16 (describing PEFC's Sustainable Forest Management Requirements).
212. Meidinger, supra note 169, at 62; Wortman, supra note 76; Visseren-Hamakers & Glas-
bergen, supra note 192, at 412.
213. MECHEL ET AL., supra note 194, at 49; PURBAWIYATNA & SIMuLA, supra note 180, at 36.
FSC still has a zero tolerance policy for producers that violate traditional or civil rights, fail to
observe high conservation values, practice illegal logging, convert natural forest to plantations,
or plant genetically modified trees. PURBAWIYATNA & SIMULA, supra note 180, at 42. See also
MECHEL ET AL., supra note 194, at 36.
214. The special rules are limited to a relatively small number of obligations to promote
worker safety, local services, and local communities, and to prevent, mitigate, and repair nega-
tive impacts on environmental values. FSC INTERNATIONAL, supra note 171, at 10.
215. Meidinger, supra note 169, at 66 n.84.
216. Id. at 67.
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The result of these changes is that-on paper at least 217-current
SFI and PEFC's standards have become nearly indistinguishable. 218
Despite this, both organizations continue to fight. This seems waste-
ful. 2 1 9 Several governments have urged FSI and PEFC to recognize
each other-although so far without result.2 2 0 Some observers predict
that governments and green building advocates will eventually force
unification by recognizing both standards equally.221
Interactions With Government. Western governments originally saw
FSC as a replacement for failed diplomatic initiatives 222 and a chance
217. Activists claim that PEFC's regulations are looser in practice. MECHEL ET AL., supra
note 194, at 11-12.
218. Compare FSC, FSC PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA FOR FOREST STEWARDSHIP 15 (2012)
[hereinafter FSC PRINCIPLES] (FSC Principle 6: "The Organization shall maintain, conserve and/
or restore ecosystem services . . . and shall avoid, repair or mitigate negative environmental
impacts") with PEFC, PEFC INTERNATIONAL STANDARD: REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTIFICATION
SCHEMES" 8 (2010) [hereinafter PEFC INTERNATIONAL] (PEFC International Standard: Crite-
rion 1: "[Alim to maintain or increase forests and other wooded areas and enhance the quality of
the economic, ecological, cultural and social values of forest resources, including soil and
water"); compare FSC PRINCIPLES, supra note 218, at 16 (FSC Principle 5: "The Organization
shall use local processing, services, and value add[ed] . . . . The Organization shall demonstrate
commitment through its planning and expenditures to long-term economic viability.") with
PEFC INTERNATIONAL, supra note 218, at 12 (PEFC International Standard Criterion 5: "Forest
management planning shall . . . give due regard to the role of forestry in rural development, and
especially consider new opportunities for employment" including "training and employment of
local people, including indigenous people, a preference for the local processing of timber and
non-wood forest products, etc." It also "shall promote the long-term health and well-being of
communities within or adjacent to the . . . area."); compare FSC PRINCIPLES, supra note 218, at
13 (FSC Principle 2: Gender equality, occupational health and safety practices, meet or exceed
minimum forest industry wages, resolving grievances through engagement with workers) and
FSC PRINCIPLES, supra note 218, at 14 (Principle 3: "Recognize and uphold the legal and cus-
tomary rights of indigenous people to maintain control over management activities within or
related to the Management Unit to the extent necessary to protect their rights, resources, lands
and territories.") with PEFC INTERNATIONAL, supra note 218, at 12 (PEFC Criterion 5: "[L]egal,
customary and traditional rights . . . shall be clarified, recognised and respected;" "disputes
should be handled according to processes or just and fair resolution; "in the interim, provide
meaningful opportunities for parties to be engaged in forest management decisions whilst re-
specting the processes and roles and responsibilities laid out in the policies and laws where the
certification takes place.").
219. See, e.g. Rotherham, supra note 197, at 610 ("As only 9% of the world's forests have
been certified it seems that the focus should be on expanding the number of FSC-approved
standards and increasing the area of certified forests and not on attacking the competition.").
220. PURBAWIYATNA & SIMULA, supra note 180, at 22, 76, 78 (citing statements by Switzer-
land, the European Parliament, and the G8); Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certifi-
cation Schemes, wHYFSC, http://www.whyfsc.com/indexl.asp?menu=7&sub=102 (last visited
May 22, 2014) ("The committee concludes that it would hope to see the approach and standard
used by FSC becoming the target for all other certification schemes, such as PEFC.").
221. UNECE, supra note 204, at 113.
222. Bithe, supra note 15, at 22 (The Austrian government supplied "a substantial part" of
FSC's start-up costs after developing countries and domestic business interests forced it to repeal
a ban on tropical wood imports).
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to exert influence beyond their borders.223 Conversely, host govern-
ments supported PEFC as a counterweight that empowers local
elites. 224 Specific tactics include grants, public praise, treating private
standards as prima facie compliance with local law,225 adopting gov-
ernment procurement policies that favor certified wood,226 and green
construction codes that track (and sometimes conflict with) FSC or
PEFC standards. 227 In recent years, however, many officials have be-
gun promoting certification in general228 without endorsing any spe-
cific standard. 229 This may be because FSC and PEFC have largely
converged. Alternatively, officials could be ideologically inclined to
"let the market decide" 230 or feel constrained by international trea-
ties. 231 Governments have also learned from private standards to up-
date their own regulations. 232
Results. As of 2011, 9.6% percent of the world's forests were certi-
fied.233 About two-thirds (62%) followed PEFC.234 Certification is
223. FOREST CERTIFICATION, supra note 170, at 12 (Austrian, Dutch, and Mexican financial
support); PURBAWIYATNA & SIMULA, supra note 180, at 44 (Danish, German, Dutch, and Swed-
ish financial support).
224. PURBAWIYATNA & SIMULA, supra note 180, at 45.
225. Meidinger, supra note 169, at 59.
226. This is particularly important in Europe where government purchases account for eleven
percent of GDP. Visseren-Hamakers & Glasbergen, supra note 192, at 416.
227. UNECE, supra note 204, at 113.
228. Visseren-Hamakers & Glasbergen, supra note 192, at 416. Press Release, UNECE, Gov-
ernments-Significant Actors for Certification of Sustainable Forest Management (Oct. 4, 2005),
available at http://www.unece.org/press/pr2005/05tim-pO7e.html; PURBAWIYATNA & SIMULA,
supra note 180, at 21-22.
229. PURBAWIYATNA & SIMULA, supra note 180, at 75 (Denmark accepts FSC, PEFC and
SFI); PEFC, PEFC ANNUAL REVIEw 2011 16 (2011), available at http://www.pefc.org/resources/
brochures/organizational-documents/982-annual-review-2011 (all national procurement policies
accept PEFC); MECHEL ET AL., supra note 194, at 6 (UK recognized PEFC and SFI after they
addressed certain shortcomings); How to Check FSC and PEFC Certification of Timber and
Wood Products, CPET, http://www.cpet.org.uk/files/Category%20A%2OPractical%20Guide%20
to%20Checking%2OCertificates.pdf (last visited May 22, 2014) (UK accepts all three standards);
PEFC, Facts and Figures, http://www.pefc.org/about-pefc/who-we-are/facts-a-figures (last visited
May 22, 2014) ("PEFC certification is a standard of choice for public timber procurement [in-
cluding in] the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan."); PURBAWIYATNA & SIMULA, supra note
180, at 75-76 (Belgium deems FSC and PEFC acceptable), 76 (Switzerland recognizes FSC and
PEFC), 76 (Japan recognizes FSC, PEFC, SFI; New Zealand does not endorse any scheme over
others) and 76-77 (Germany accepts FSC and the PEFC but not SFI); MECHEL ET AL., supra
note 194, at 23, 25-26 (Netherlands is developing certification system similar to FSC). Many
governments permit suppliers to show sustainability without any standard at all.
PURBAWIYATNA & SIMULA, supra note 180, at 10 (UK, Denmark, Germany, Japan and France
and New Zealand).
230. PURBAWIYATNA & SIMULA, supra note 180, at 75.
231. MECHEL ET AL., supra note 194, at 7-8 (Constraints include the WTO Agreement on
Government Procurement and various EU Directives).
232. Meidinger, supra note 169, at 78.
233. UNECE, supra note 204, at 109; Rotherham, supra note 197, at 610.
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now widespread in Europe (57%) and North America (32%)235 but
has made little progress in the tropics, where profit margins are thin
and the required reforms are costly.236 At current growth rates, it will
be eighty years before half of the world's forests are certified.237
As in our coffee and fisheries examples, the key economic fact
seems to be that most consumers prefer certified wood but are unwill-
ing to pay a premium.238 This has encouraged large oligopolists in the
home improvement, 239 paper, 240 and home construction 241 industries
to defend their market share by offering certified products.242 The net
result is that certification has become nearly universal across the
twenty-seven percent of U.S. forestland owned by large timber com-
panies like Weyerhauser with smaller firms providing additional sup-
plies as needed.243 Many retailers seem to have shifted some or all of
their compliance costs onto these firms.244
The story outside oligopoly markets is very different. There, firms
have no choice but to buy wood at the lowest possible price.
234. UNECE, supra note 204, at 109
235. Id.
236. PURBAWIYATNA & SIMULA, supra note 180, at 17, 21, 27 (small and medium-sized tropi-
cal suppliers cannot afford certification); MECHEL ET AL., supra note 194, at 14, 37 ("compara-
tively huge investments" will be needed to meet FSC standards in the tropics). PEFC has been
handicapped by the fact that national forestry associations are rare in the tropics.
PURBAWIYATNA & SIMULA, supra note 180, at 28.
237. UNECE, supra note 204, at 109.
238. PURBAWIYATNA & SIMULA, supra note 180, at 11 (while retailers and consumers give
"preferences to sustainably produced timber," suppliers doubt their willingness to pay premiums
that cover costs); Meidinger, supra note 169, at 76-77 ("very few" retail consumers are willing
pay price premiums); FOREST CERTIFICATION, supra note 170, at 8 (same).
239. The home improvement/do-it-yourself industry was extraordinarily concentrated in the
early 2000s, with the two largest firms-Home Depot and Lowes-possessing seventy-one per-
cent of the market. Sasser, supra note 173, at 237.
240. AF&PA members include disproportionate numbers of "large pulp and paper opera-
tions." Stephen Harris & Rene Germaine, Improving Forest Management Through the Supply
Chain: an Assessment of Wood Procurement Managagement Systems in the Forest Products In-
dustry in FOREST POLICY FOR PRIVATE FORESTRY, supra note 176, at 264-65. Paper products
account for about half of North American (54%) and world (52%) wood products consumption.
UNECE, supra note 204, at 85.
241. The top five homebuilding firms account for 29% of new construction. Two of these firms
adopted sustainability standards in the early 2000s. Sasser, supra note 173, at 237.
242. PURBAWIYATNA & SIMULA, supra note 180, at 82 (quoting WalMart executive's state-
ment that "shifting to sustainable timber has not added one single penny to the price of our
tissue").
243. As of 2003, roughly one in five small mills belonged to SF. Harris & Germaine, supra
note 240, at 263 (quoting self-reported survey data).
244. Auld et al., supra note 170, at 277 (Only 30% of surveyed landowners expect to receive a
premium for certified wood); PURBAWIYATNA & SIMULA, supra note 180, at 11 (Tropical suppli-
ers do not believe that retailers will pay premiums that cover certification costs.).
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Thousands of small U.S. mills and private forests provide the uncerti-
fied wood needed to meet this demand. 245
Certification has almost certainly increased conservation efforts in
participating forests.246 These added compliance costs range from a
few percent of revenue for lumber to perhaps ten percent for pulp-
wood.247 This figure is not much smaller than the nineteen percent
"tax" that government regulation is thought to impose on the U.S.
economy. 248
IV. THEORY OF PRIVATE POLITICS (1): PERFECT INFORMATION
Our five examples are inherently anecdotal. Policy requires a
deeper and more general understanding. We proceed as follows. Sec-
tion A builds on our examples to explain how modern supply chains
generate private power and define voting rules. Section B describes
the social and economic forces which determine how big corporations
exercise that power. We argue that many private standards are de-
signed to please a shadow electorate of consumers and employees.
Section C looks at how private and public political systems interact
and can sometimes strengthen each other.
245. Press Release, Int'l Wood Mkts. Grp., Canada & U.S. "Top 20" Lumber Producers' Re-
port Indicates Renewed Industry Optimism (March 21, 2013) (Top 5 producers produce 31% of
U.S. lumber; top 20 produce 58%.): Harris & Germaine, supra note 240, at 259 (Most forest
products firms purchase their wood fiber needs from small brokers and loggers on the open
market).
246. See, e.g., Meidinger, supra note 169, at 77 (Forest certification has produced "improved
environmental and social practices in many parts of the world"); MECHEL ET AL., supra note 194,
at 10 (2006) (Analysis of Corrective Action Requests suggests that FSC has improved forest
management).
247. Information on compliance costs can be found in Auld et al., supra note 170, at 278
(More than eighty percent of forest owners believe certification expenses, increased administra-
tive burdens, and operating restrictions are significant); PURBAWIYATNA & SIMULA, supra note
180, at 31 n.11 (Forest certification costs $0.50/hectare per year rising to $1/hectare every five
years with additional chain of custody costs totaling $500 per assessment regardless of acreage);
RALPH J. AuG ET AL., LAND USE CHANGES INVOLVING FORESTRY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1952
TO 1997, WITH PROJEcrIONS To 2050 91 (2003) (defining "timberland" as land that produces at
least 20 cubic feet/acre/year); Density of Woods, SI METRic, http://www.simetric.co.uk/si
wood.htm (last visited May 23, 2014) (hard- and softwood volumes per metric ton); Changyou
Sun & Henry W. Kinnucan, Economic Impact of Environmental Regulations on Southern Soft-
wood Stumpage Markets: A Reappraisal, 25 S. J. APPLIED FORESTRY 108 (2001) (prices per ton).
In practice, timber lost to operating restrictions in certified forests is almost completely replaced
by new production from uncertified forests. Brown & Zhang, supra note 187, at 2061-63. How-
ever, this fact cannot erase the environmental gains from private regulation unless we assume
that new logging occurs on land that is even more vulnerable than the land that FSC takes out of
service. Id. This seems implausible.
248. DEVIN BOWEN, COST OF GOVERNMENT DAY 6 (2012), available at http://costofgovern
ment.org/files/files/COGD2012_hi%20res.pdf.
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A. Private Power and Voting Rules
Private power only occurs in special circumstances. Tellingly, all
five of our examples involve corporate supply chains. 2 4 9 But just
where does corporate power come from? The central fact, in the
words of one observer, is that suppliers are afraid to defy "a huge
retailer they can't afford to lose." 250 The more careful answer is that
private power works best in industries where suppliers must incur
large up-front investments ("fixed costs") to sell goods at a small
mark-up. 251 Here, the key point is that suppliers must maintain con-
sistently high sales volumes to earn a profit. The rub, of course, is that
large customers can change suppliers at any time. When this happens,
the supplier immediately starts to lose money. Big customers often
maximize this leverage by deliberately focusing their purchases on a
small group of preferred suppliers. Suppliers who fail to deliver ex-
ceptional price and quality-or, in our case, to observe standards-
lose their status and are immediately terminated. 252
So far, we have considered transactions between individual buyers
and sellers. But many large retailers insist that their suppliers practice
the same ethics for everyone they sell to.253 This forces standards
onto buyers who never agreed to and may even oppose them. Finally,
we have said that suppliers need a minimum sales volume to remain
profitable. When enough customers request the standard, scale econ-
omies in the non-compliant product disappear. At this point the pri-
vate standard becomes universal.254 This critical mass defines our
voting rule.
249. See generally Stephen M. Maurer & Sebastian von Engelhardt, Industry Self-Governance
and National Security: On the Private Control of Dual Use Technologies (UC Berkeley Goldman
Sch. of Pub. Pol'y, Working Paper No. GSPP12-005, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2189919.
250. Wellik, supra note 47; see also Mayer & Gereffi, supra note 15, at 8 ("[F]irms with large
market shares . . . source from many smaller suppliers, each of which may have few options
other than doing business with the lead firm.").
251. See generally Maurer & von Engelhardt, supra note 249. The nature of the investment
does not matter so long as it requires large up-front (fixed) costs. Familiar examples include
investments in plant equipment, training, and even learning how to serve the peculiarities of a
specific customer.
252. The threat would not be credible if switching suppliers significantly increased the large
firm's costs. Large firms can almost always avoid this fate by finding a new preferred supplier or
by spreading purchases across multiple small suppliers.
253. Examples in the coffee sector include Sara Lee and Proctor & Gamble. Kolk, supra note
125, at 230. Astra-Zeneca follows a similar policy in the pharmaceutical industry. STEPHEN M.
MAURER, REGULATION WITHOUT GOVERNMENT (2012). In many cases, no agreement is neces-
sary. We have seen that suppliers often find it cheaper to adopt a single standard than to main-
tain duplicate facilities.
254. The tipping point occurs when industry-wide demand for the lower standard falls below
the volume needed to support just one supplier.
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From Voting Rules to Outcomes. Voters in our simplest examples
(tuna, food safety) developed standards through simple face-to-face
negotiations. Here, the politics are obvious: The winning coalition
must offer each member a closer approximation to its preferred stan-
dard than any other group. This simple analysis assumes perfect infor-
mation. However, small voters cannot afford much face-to-face
discussion. Instead, they will often base their decisions on incomplete
information and advice from trusted intermediaries. 255 This makes
outcomes vulnerable to random misunderstandings and deliberate
trickery. Procedures that establish orderly hearings and debate re-
duce this danger and make politics more predictable.
Delegation. So far, we have assumed that big customers exercise
power directly. However, we have seen that firms often share power
in exchange for information or to show transparency. In extreme
cases, retailers may even cede power entirely.256
This delegation clearly makes the recipients better off: Otherwise,
they would not accept power in the first place. 257 For this reason, we
can be confident that any standard that includes, say, large numbers of
ecologists really does improve the environment. At the same time,
our argument says nothing about how the benefits are divided.
Whether by luck or negotiating skill, some parties will normally re-
ceive more than others.
Legitimacy. The economics of private power place hard limits on
what private goverance can accomplish. First, voting rules often re-
quire supermajorities. 258 This is arguably undemocratic since it blocks
many outcomes that a conventional government would pass by major-
ity vote. At the same time, we can be sure that whatever private ini-
tiatives do go forward have broad support. In this sense, the average
private standard is almost always more democratic than the average
public one.
255. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS (1975).
256. There have been several cases where large purchasers of nanotechnology and artificial
DNA products called on suppliers to self-govern without demanding specific terms. This makes
sense for industries where designing a standard requires arcane knowledge. Stephen M. Maurer,
Five Easy Pieces: Case Studies of Entrepreneurs Who Organized Private Communities for a Pub-
lic Purpose (UC Berkeley Goldman Sch. of Pub. Pol'y, Working Paper No. GSPP 2010-11, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1713329%20.
257. This is only true over the long run; in the short term, players may tolerate unfavorable
outcomes so long as their expected benefit is positive.
258. This is offset by the fact that votes are denominated in dollars so that big companies have
more power than small ones. Despite this, our examples suggest that private governance often
requires buy-in from perhaps a half-dozen firms.
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Second, no delegation is irrevocable: The big corporations can take
back power whenever they like. This suggests that private power can-
not yield outcomes that consistently frustrate the dominant compa-
nies. Even so, private power gives society more chances for collective
action than it had before. Courts should welcome this.
Finally, suppliers and NGOs that accept delegated power often pro-
test that they deserve more generous terms. But this only shows that
their alternative options are limited. Giving these groups more access
to formal government would automatically expand their private lever-
age as well.
B. Private Politics: The Players
We have emphasized that private standards are enforced by big cor-
porations. This section asks how well their preferences track popular
opinion. We consider three polar cases.
Perfect Markets. We start with the classical limit in which competi-
tion forces firms' economic profits to zero. 259 Here, the usual argu-
ment that companies are irresponsible "because they only care about
money" cannot be right. Indeed, a company that fails to invest $1.00
in precautions to avoid $1.05 in expected losses will soon go broke.
Still, the complaint contains a grain of truth: Companies in perfectly
competitive markets cannot afford to adopt purely voluntary or op-
tional methods. If they do, new entrants will flood in to undercut
them. This means that competitive markets can only address
problems for which society has already defined a price. This can hap-
pen either because consumers are willing to pay more for compliant
goods or suppliers believe that accidents will lead to higher regulatory
burdens and/or legal liability. 260
Oligopoly Markets and Shadow Electorates. Price competition in
real markets is often suppressed. However, this does not mean that
competition is dead. In many markets, firms will still compete to sell
more units at the stabilized price. This is almost always done by offer-
ing consumers non-cash benefits. These can be utilitarian (e.g. higher
quality), psychic (e.g. celebrity endorsements), 261 or social (e.g. sus-
259. "Economic profit" is equal to the "accounting profit" that appears on balance sheets less
opportunity costs, i.e. what the investor could have earned by investing in her second-best busi-
ness opportunity. Profit (Economics) WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Profit_(econom-
ics) (last vistied May 23, 2014).
260. For the classic statement of deterrence theory, see U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d
169 (2d Cir. 1947). For an analysis of how the risk of regulatory backlash affects corporate
behavior, see Maurer & von Engelhardt, supra note 249.
261. DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 49 (2005); Mayer & Gereffi, supra note 15, at 9-10. ("When demand for
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tainable production). We have seen that consumers are often willing
to switch brands over social issues. This can produce spectacular
losses in profitability and share prices.262
This competition for market share turns consumers into a kind of
shadow electorate. The good news is that the resulting vote is reason-
ably democratic in the sense that the customers who buy popular
brands (StarKist) or patronize national retailers (Home Depot) are
almost identical to the voters who turn out for federal elections.263
The bad news is that this shadow electorate seldom faces clear
choices. Instead, consumers' purchasing decisions almost always re-
flect a complex mix of self-interest (quality), intangible psychic bene-
fits (celebrity endorsement), and public policy (environmental values).
That said, these problems are not very different from conventional
elections where voters are asked to make policy choices based on an
uncertain mix of social responsibility (e.g. building new schools), indi-
vidual self-interest (avoiding new taxes), and psychic values (candi-
date charisma).
Non-monetary benefits are also important on the cost side. Schol-
ars have shown that corporate social initiatives often improve the bot-
tom line through higher morale and productivity, 264 increased ability
to attract talented workers,265 and less employee turnover. 266 This
suggests that corporate employees often constitute a second shadow
electorate alongside consumers.
a product is less a function of observable utility than of constructed brand identity, firms are
more vulnerable to social pressure."); Tanja Borzel et al., Racing to the Top? Regulatory Compe-
tition Among Firms in Areas of Limited Statehood, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT STATE 144, 147
(Thomas Risse ed., 2011) ("[O]nce a firm starts engaging in self-regulation . . . competitors will
have strong incentives to follow suit for fear of losing market shares").
262. CONROY, supra note 45, at 12 (Nike's revenue fell by sixteen percent and its stock price
by fifty-seven percent following media criticism in 1997-98.); Fuchs, Khalfagiannini, & Arendt-
sen, supra note 49 at 40 (Criticism of Kenyan labor and pesticide policies produced significant
"market losses for UK retailers.").
263. The 2013 hacking attacks against Target affected 70-110 million customers or about one-
third of the U.S. population. Monica Langley, Inside Target, CEO Struggles to Regain Shoppers'
Trust, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19 2014). This is only slightly smaller than the 80-130 million citizens
who typically cast votes in U.S. national elections. Michael Tomasky, Turnout: Explains a Lot,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2010, 7:18 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/michael
tomasky/2010/nov/03/us-midterm-elections-2010-turnout-says-a-lot (81.5m U.S. voters cast bal-
lots in 2010 midterm election); FED. ELECTION COMM'N, FEDERAL ELECTIONs 2012 5 (2012),
available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalelections2Ol2.pdf (129.1m U.S. voters cast
ballots in 2012 presidential election).
264. VOGEL, supra note 261, at 16. Some observers claim that socially responsible corpora-
tions are able to pay lower wages although the evidence is controversial. Id. at 58.
265. Id. at 56. Ninety-seven percent of business students claim that they would accept an
average of fourteen percent lower income to work for companies with "a better reputation for
corporate social responsibility and ethics." Id.
266. Id. at 57-58.
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In principle, non-price competition can continue to the point where
corporations spend all of their economic profit trying to please their
consumers and/or employees. In this case, private regulation is only
slightly less stringent than traditional government, which can ban
products entirely.
Monopolists and Corporate Citizenship. Finally, suppose that firms
suppress both price and non-price competition. Executives and share-
holders must now decide whether to pocket their monopoly profit or
else spend it to override market signals by, for example, paying above-
market wages. Here, a relative handful of privileged executives exer-
cise power based on a complex mix of greed, ethics, professional
norms, peer pressure, ideology, and perceived social obligation. 267
One could argue that this outcome is still preferable to no private ac-
tion at all, particularly when the elites hold plausibly mainstream
views. That said, U.S. antitrust law has traditionally rejected this pos-
sibility, and we ignore it in what follows.
Putting it Together. Perfect price competition leads to the familiar
world of deterrence theory. Imperfect competition retains these in-
centives but also requires corporations to please shadow electorates of
consumers and workers. This is by far the most democratic outcome.
Finally, fully cartelized industries let executives ignore both signals.
This provides a second, political reason to oppose cartels.
But these are special cases. More usually, real markets feature lim-
ited-but-imperfect competition that mixes all three scenarios. Here,
corporate elites respond to a complex mix of liability fears, market
share, and personal preferences. In this respect, corporate CEOs are
not too different from elected officials who try to please the voters but
also exercise significant discretion. Crucially, the balance can be in-
ferred from market structure. Thus, we expect firms in competitive
markets to act mainly from price signals, like expected liability, and
oligopolists to pay attention to shadow electorates. Conversely, mo-
nopolists face few market constraints: We therefore expect them to act
from personal and sometimes idiosyncratic beliefs.
C. Interactions With Government
We have seen that public and private regulation often proceed in
parallel. The question remains whether these two channels can inter-
act and strengthen each other.
267. Id. at 13 (firm managers can balance claims of shareholders, consumers, and the public
with their own personal commitment to civic purposes).
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The Preemption Myth. Private regulation is often criticized as a
cynical attempt to preempt government with weak measures that im-
prove conditions in Industry A just enough so that regulators turn
their attention to Industry B. However, this is no bad thing if govern-
ment really does have limited resources and attention span. While
Industry A receives less attention, this is only because officials believe
that Industry B's problems are now more urgent. On net, this sounds
like an improvement. 268
Similar arguments imply that some industries may never receive
government attention. Here, private governance is the only game in
town. In the words of former FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky,
Self-regulation often may deter conduct that would be universally
considered undesirable, but that the civil or criminal law does not
prohibit. For example, cheating in sporting contests may not violate
the law because the improper conduct is not considered sufficiently
serious or because no injured party is likely to appear to bring suit.
As a result, industry self-regulation may provide the only meaning-
ful deterrent to would-be cross checkers and bean ball artists.269
A more troubling critique is that private standards can sometimes
replace or override government outcomes. Indeed, our coffee, lum-
ber, dolphin, and fish examples all began as attempts to evade a
stalled diplomatic process. From this perspective, forcing the West's
"embedded liberalism" onto global marketS270 smacks of colonialism.
This objection can only be overcome by making private governance at
least as democratic as the official forums it displaces. Efforts by 4C,
FSC, and PEFC to include local elites are a long step in this direction.
Interactions. Information exchange can only happen where private
and public standards coexist. 2 7 1 Given that the two channels will-
and indeed must-interact, we should worry that one may suppress
the other.
For companies, private governance is about cost. From this stand-
point, developing a private standard provides a hedge in case the offi-
cial regulation turns out to be inadequate, or late, or never arrives at
all. But as time goes by, firms learn more. If the public standard ap-
268. Pitofsky, supra note 12 ("[Elnforcement agencies have demonstrated in their case selec-
tion and advisory opinions that they are not in the business of challenging legitimate and well-
intentioned self-regulation . . .
269. Id.
270. Mayer & Gereffi, supra note 15, at 4.
271. Id. at 17-18 (predicting "the emergence of multi-stakeholder governance in which public
and private modes of governance interact and reinforce each other").
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pears to be succeeding, companies may rationally decide to abandon
the private channel altogether.272
Government always has the last word. If it wants to, it can ban
private standards within national borders. For a large nation like the
U.S. this will automatically cripple them abroad as well. Alterna-
tively, government can promote private standards with grants, pro-
curement regulations, and public encouragement ("jawboning"). Our
examples suggest that governments have historically intervened based
on ad hoc judgments that particular private initiatives would extend
their power. However, future policymakers could well decide that pri-
vate governance should be promoted as an end in itself. This might be
based on a pragmatic hope that helping communities self-govern will
displace chaos and extremism. Alternatively, officials could conclude
that private democracy is inherently desirable on ideological grounds.
V. THEORY OF PRIVATE POLITICS (11). INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
So far we have focused on how private politics translates individual
preferences into collective action. However, democracy is only possi-
ble when voters know the costs and benefits associated with every
possible standard. Our coffee and lumber examples suggest that these
estimates are often wrong. Private political systems should be judged
by their ability to develop information that avoids and corrects such
mistakes. Professors Farrell and Saloner point out that this can be
done either through conventional political debates or Silicon Valley-
style "standards wars." 273 It is an open question as to which arrange-
ment works best.2 74
Section A explores how incomplete information leads to unbal-
anced standards that frustrate democratic outcomes. Section B ana-
lyzes how private political institutions ("Internal Politics") try to
overcome this problem. Finally, Section C argues that competition
between multiple standards ("External Competition") can sometimes
elicit information more efficiently and lead to better outcomes than
institutions that rely exclusively on internal politics.
A. Imperfect Information and "Unbalanced" Standards
Democratic decisionmaking is critically dependent on knowing (a)
how many suppliers will adopt a particular standard, and (b) how the
272. This dynamic is partly offset by the fact that the cost of completing the private standard
falls over time.
273. See Farrell & Saloner, supra note 3.
274. Id.
2014] 337
338 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 12:297
Ac.S ff a St-a Ccee.
AUtis& Dem!7d fW a Sm-S Coft.
FIG. 1
costs of regulation will be shared among suppliers, retailers, and con-
sumers.275 In principle, this information is encoded in the certified
product's supply and demand curves. However, these are poorly
known and what information does exist is closely guarded.
Figure 1 presents a generic analysis of the problem. Suppose suppli-
ers and retailers agree to pursue a specific standard. Their expected
costs and rewards assume that supply and demand will intersect at
some particular point, say Point 1. If this prediction is correct, every
supplier who implements the standard will find a buyer willing to pay
the expected premium. Politically, everyone gets what they bargained
for. However, we have seen that real standards often generate more
supply than demand (4C, SFI) and vice versa (FSC). This situation is
unstable, since suppliers who earn nothing from the standard will
eventually drop out so that supply and demand come into balance at
Point 2. This, however, implies a radically different set of benefits and
burdens than the parties anticipated. Institutions that find themselves
in this predicament will often want to take corrective action. For ex-
ample, parties who find themselves at Point 2 could adopt a new and
275. Retailers and suppliers can only subsidize standards to the extent that they earn positive
(economic) profit.
PUBLIC PROBLEMS, PRIVATE ANSWERS
tougher standard with the goal of establishing a new equilibrium
(Point 3), which is closer to the parties' democratically-agreed target
(Point 1).
This cycle of error-and-correction can delay or defeat democratic
choice. The question remains whether better institutions can fix the
problem. To the extent that human knowledge is limited, the answer
is almost certainly "no." The case is different, however, where suppli-
ers and buyers possess asymmetric information and are tempted to
deceive each other. Our five examples suggest that such effects are
often important. On the one hand, the fishing, lumber, and coffee
examples suggest that suppliers are almost always forced to subsidize
the cost of new standards. 276 This gives them an obvious incentive to
claim poverty or, in terms of Figure 1, to mislead retailers into think-
ing that the supply curve for strong standards is weaker than it really
is. Conversely, our coffee example suggests that big retailers can trick
suppliers into investing in standards by overstating predicted demand
so that suppliers end up subsidizing retailers. 277 Private political insti-
tutions should be organized to reduce these information asymmetries
and expose trickery as much as possible.
B. Internal Politics
The simplest politics take place within a single institution that de-
bates, implements, and updates standards over time. Political debate
provides an obvious strategy for overcoming information asymme-
tries. For example, we expect advocates to selectively reveal informa-
tion that favors their standard. This forces opponents to disclose
additional information as a corrective, which can potentially ignite still
more rounds of disclosure and counter-disclosure. The net result is
that debate elicits more information than the actors would voluntarily
disclose. Information can also be revealed through miscalculation.
This is particularly likely when members share confidential informa-
tion as a way of developing trust. Finally, employees may deliberately
ignore their employers' interests from personal conviction or to ex-
press solidarity with the collaboration. These loyalties may be purely
276. This statement is not true of competitive industries where suppliers earn zero (economic)
profit. In this case, we expect companies to leave the market instead of paying subsidies.
277. Even if suppliers later abandon the new standard, their compliance still confers a tempo-
rary benefit on retailers. More importantly, some suppliers may never revert at all if the cost of
maintaining the new standard is low or changing standards is expensive. This is especially true
where the baseline standard provides a stepping stone so that higher and more lucrative stan-
dards become affordable.
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psychological or a calculated attempt to build outside business
relationships. 278
C. External Politics
Our food and lumber examples suggest that competing standards
are common.279 In many ways the situation resembles a political elec-
tion, with each side trying to build a community of retailers and sup-
pliers around its proposal. At the same time, there are important
differences. First, retailers can recognize more than one standard at a
time. This lets them experience several standards before selecting a
winner. Second, standards can evolve. This means that the eventual
winning standard may look very different from the players' original
proposals. Finally, the contest does not end until some critical mass of
retailers decides that competition is no longer in their interest. This
could happen because retailers decide that there is little left to learn
or that a unified standard will be cheaper and more effective. At the
same time, our forestry and food examples show that rival standards
can persist indefinitely.
External competition also has drawbacks. First, political actors are
split into two camps. This means that each competing group has less
information to draw on. Second, there are fewer political differences
within each group and, therefore, less incentive to invest in the politi-
cal debates that generate new information. Finally, we expect com-
peting institutions to attack each other. Negative attacks that depress
one standard's popularity without raising the other's weaken both
sides.
On current evidence, it is hard to say whether external politics
works better than internal politics or vice versa. That said, the for-
estry and food standards seem to have undergone more frequent (and
substantial) changes than tuna, fisheries, or coffee. Pending further
evidence, courts should be open to the possibility that external politics
is an efficient way to promote democratic outcomes.
VI. CURRENT LAW
This section reviews the law of private power. Part A begins with
common law and constitutional limits. These are almost entirely pro-
cedural. Part B explains how the Sherman Act places substantive lim-
278. For a description of cross-cutting loyalties in commercial open source, see Stephen M.
Maurer, The Penguin and the Cartel: Rethinking Antitrust and Innovation Policy for the Age of
Commercial Open Source, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 269 (2012).
279. The synthetic gene industry similarly features two private standards and one public one.
MAURER, supra note 253.
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its on acts that affect competition. Finally, Part C examines Sherman
Act cases that limit private power for political reasons that have noth-
ing to do with markets or economic efficiency.
A. Common Law
Common law courts regulate private power under various theories.
Past and present association members usually claim "advantages inci-
dent to membership" under contract and fiduciary duty law.280 Non-
members can similarly sue under tort theories including assault, defa-
mation, and interference with economic advantage. 281 Finally, both
groups can invoke constitutional theories where private associations
perform "governmental functions by the sufferance of the state." 282
In practice, almost all of the case law focuses on procedural defects.
Most notably, private rulemaking must follow previously announced
procedures that provide for notice, comment, reasoned debate, and
majority vote. 2 8 3 Private enforcement proceedings must similarly of-
fer notice and good-faith hearings.284 The stringency of these require-
ments depends on what is at stake. Thus, actions to protect industry
must carefully consider the public interest and the accused's right to
280. Hatley v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass'n., 552 F.2d 646, 655 (5th Cir. 1977).
281. Note, Developments in the Law: Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations: The
Traditional Theories, 76 HARV. L. REv. 998, 1000-01 (1963).
282. Id. at 63.
283. Gilder v. PGA Tour, Inc., 936 F.2d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 1991) (Directors cannot change
existing rules to achieve a specific result in a pending matter.); Charles 0. Finley & Co., v. Kuhn,
569 F.2d 527, 544 (7th Cir. 1978) (Organization cannot adopt rules in "disregard" of its own
"charter or bylaws."); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1147 (5th Cir. 1977) (Rulemaking
satisfied due process where organization followed its own procedures, conducted careful study
and deliberation, gave notice to affected parties, and held majority vote.). A fortiori, rules
adopted by supermajorities command more deference. Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1147 (noting that
by-law was changed by "greater than majority vote").
284. Lindemann v. Am. Horse Shows Ass'n, 624 N.Y.S. 2d 723, 727 (1994) (criticizing "pro
forma" hearings and "arbitrary," "capricious," or "pretextual" exercises of discretion); Hatley,
552 F.2d at 654-55 (Organization must hold hearings where enforcement depends on subjective
determination or discretion.); Jackson v. Am. Yorkshire Club, 340 F. Supp. 628, 632 (N.D. Iowa
1971) (Principles of "natural justice" require notice, hearing, and an opportunity to defend one-
self.). Cases discussing good faith include: Charles 0. Finley, 569 F.2d 527 at 540 (Hearings must
be conducted "in good faith, after investigation, consultation and deliberation" and should not
be an "abrupt departure" form past practice or a "change of policy."); STP Corp. v. U.S. Auto
Club, 286 F. Supp. 146, 170 (S.D. Ind. 1968) (Private rules enforcement must follow "rudimen-
tary due process procedures" and any actions must be "reasonable, done in good faith, and . . .
not discriminatory."); Gilder, 936 F.2d at 424 (Board of Directors owes members a fiduciary duty
and has duty to act "in the best interests of the corporation" and not for "private gain."); and
Lindemann, 624 N.Y.S. 2d at 727 (1994) (rejecting "pro forma," "arbitrary," "capricious," and
"pretextual" hearings).
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earn a living or operate a business. 285 Conversely, courts are more
deferential when the private association possesses "specialized compe-
tence," 286 the accused has countervailing power,287 or there is no con-
flict of interest. 288 Though courts hardly ever say so, this willingness
to balance strongly suggests that judges see private governance as val-
uable and legitimate.289
At the same time, these common law hurdles are modest: Private
associations willing to adopt near-copies of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or the Administrative Procedure Act are almost certainly
safe from scrutiny.290 With the exception of dolphin-safe tuna, all of
our private rule-making examples feature elaborate charters that meet
this test. While courts often say that they are prepared to strike down
285. Falcone v. Middlesex Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 170 A.2d 791, 799 (N.J. 1961) (Association hold-
ing "a virtual monopoly over the use of local hospital facilities" must act in a "reasonable and
lawful manner" in the interests of "the medical profession and the public generally."); Carroll v.
Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers, 31 A.2d 223, 225 (N.J. Ch.1943) (Union rules that admitted certain
members "as juniors with no voice in the affairs of the union" violated right to earn a liveli-
hood.); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (Liberty interest included "the right of the individ-
ual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life."); James v. Marinship Corp.,
155 P.2d 329, 335 (Cal. 1944) (Unions holding "a monopoly of the supply of labor" occupied "a
quasi-public position similar to that of a public service business" and had "certain corresponding
obligations."); Jackson, 340 F.Supp. at 630 (N.D. Iowa 1971) (Membership in private association
was "necessary and vital to a profitable purebred hog breeding program."); Lindemann, 624
N.Y.S.2d at 725 (1994) ("The arbitrary action of a private association is not immune from judi-
cial scrutiny. .. where there is a showing of 'economic necessity' for membership and 'monopoly
power' over the profession."); Marjorie Webster Junior Coll., Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of
Colls. & Secondary Sch., Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("[A]ppellant does not wield
such monopoly power over the operation of educational institutions that its standards for accred-
itation may be subject to plenary judicial review.").
286. Marjorie Webster Junior Coll., 432 F.2d at 658.
287. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 765 (1939); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
H§ 767, 768 (1977); Marjorie Webster Junior Coll., 432 F.2d at 658 (Plaintiff could organize its
own accreditation body.).
288. Note, Developments in the Law: Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations: Asso-
ciation Action Affecting Nonmembers, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1037, 1046-47 (1963) [hereinafter Asso-
ciation Action Affecting Nonmembers] (Courts are "less sympathetic" where there is an
"apparent self-serving interest in the standards and the lack of a well-established tradition of
self-policing.").
289. Courts also accept lower standards where more burdensome procedures could deprive
organizations of "the ability to promote ... specific social goals generally believed to be desira-
ble." Note, Developments in the Law: Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations: Frame-
work for the Judicial Inquiry, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 990, 991 (1963) [hereinafter Framework for the
Judicial Inquiry].
290. Government is invariably cited as the gold standard for private regulation. Hatley v.
Am. Quarter Horse Ass'n., 552 F.2d 646, 654-55 (5th Cir. 1977) (Procedural protections for
private associations are "something akin to traditional due process."); Lindemann v. Am. Horse
Shows Ass'n, 624 N.Y.S. 2d 723, 730 (1994) (Private association which controlled equestrian
sports did not qualify as state action but was nevertheless obligated to follow the "earmarks" of
due process and observe procedures "congruent" with conventional review by a government
agency).
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substantive rules that conflict with "the law of the land," "settled pub-
lic policy," "good morals," "fairness," 291 or "minimum rationality," 2 9 2
they hardly ever act on these sentiments. 293
B. The Sherman Act (I): Protecting Markets
Congress limits private economic power through the antitrust laws.
Case law since the 1960s almost always focuses on protecting markets.
This includes procedural requirements to confirm that rulemaking is a
genuine attempt to solve problems rather than an excuse to suppress
competition. More recent cases have added a broad hint that private
standards cannot limit competition to achieve "ethical goals" that lack
any well-defined market price.
Procedural Requirements. Congress has authorized various indus-
tries to self-regulate even where the resulting rules would normally
violate the Sherman Act. However, the Supreme Court's Silver deci-
sion holds that these rules are only valid if they "further[] legitimate
self-regulative ends." 294 In particular, private bodies must adopt suffi-
cient procedures to confirm that private rules are genuinely designed
to address industry problems and not just an excuse to suppress com-
petition.295 This includes requiring notice-and-hearing procedures to
weed out "unsupportable accusations," giving dissenters the chance to
present evidence of ulterior motive, and generating a record for anti-
trust review. 296 Courts have since extended Silver to cases where pri-
291. Harley, 522 F.2d at 655 (Association policy cannot conflict with "good morals," the
"bounds of reason," "common sense," "fairness," state law, or "public policy."); Charles 0. Fin-
ley & Co., v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 544 (7th Cir. 1978) (Rules cannot conflict with "the law of the
land."); Falcone v. Middlesex Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 170 A.2d 791, 800 (N.J. 1961) (striking down
actions that "run[] strongly counter to the public policy of our State and the true interests of
justice"); Framework for the Judicial Inquiry, supra note 289, at 997 (Social policy is only in-
voked in the "clearest cases" and where private rules would require members to "commit
crimes" or prevent them "from performing public duties such as serving on juries."); James v.
Marinship Corp., 155 P.2d 329, 337 (Cal. 1944) (Private rules cannot be contrary to "public
policy," conflict with state or federal law, and, in some states, common law precedents where
"the law has definitely set its face."); Jackson v. Am. Yorkshire Club, 340 F. Supp. 628, 632 (N.D.
Iowa 1971) (Private rules must be "reasonable," "pursuant to the rules and laws of the organiza-
tion," "in good faith," and not in "violation of the law of the land.").
292. Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1144 (5th Cir. 1977). This does not mean that they
must be "perfectly suited" or "perfectly fair" but only "rationally related to that objective, and
free from arbitrariness and invidious discrimination. Id.
293. But see James, 155 P.2d at 342 (overturning union rule against admitting black members);
Carroll v. Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers, 31 A.2d 223, 225 (N.J. Ch. 1943) (Public policy required
unions to be "democratic" and admit all who are "reasonably qualified for their trade.").
294. Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 358 (1963).
295. See id.
296. Id. at 364-65.
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vate rules are needed to create a market, promote competition, or
increase output under the Rule of Reason.297
For the most part, these requirements seem indistinguishable from
the preexisting common law rules. 298 For example, rulemaking must
follow basic notice-and-comment procedureS299 and be done in good
faith,300 while enforcement similarly requires adequate notice and
hearing301 and good faith. 302 However, there is some indication that
297. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). For an authoritative summary
of how courts have applied Silver, see Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp.
1049, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
298. But see Hatley v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass'n., 552 F.2d 646, 654-55 (5th Cir. 1977) (Fail-
ure to provide hearing violated state due process but not Sherman Act).
299. Jackson v. Am. Yorkshire Club, 340 F.Supp. 628, 635 (N.D. Iowa 1971) (Rulemaking
body must follow its own rules and regulations.); Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n.,
Inc., 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1122 (D. Neb. 1981) (Association was required to provide "notice and
comment procedure[s]" sufficient "to inform those potentially affected" and "allow interested
parties to be heard"); Id. (Association was required to hold fair hearings that considered both
"favorable and unfavorable evidence" so that excluded products "were given a fair trial"); Id.
(Silver does not require rule-making procedures to be a "model of procedural due process" and
may not require any hearing at all.); E. A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consol. Air Tour Manual
Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 188 (5th Cir. 1972) (Fact that tests were "unsophisticated and poorly
done, and the data poorly preserved" was irrelevant absent evidence of collusion, bias or bad
faith.); M&H Tire Co., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973 984, (1st Cir. 1984)
(Selecting a tire was "essentially [a] business judgment" that did not "call[ ] for elaborate quasi-
judicial procedures like those suitable in cases of penalties, discipline, or suspension."); Am.
Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Broads., 407 F. Supp. 900, 902 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (finding that rule was justified where concern was not "frivolous" even though "science"
did not rise to a "mathematical certainty").
300. M&H Tire, 733 F.2d at 984 (Procedures need only be adequate to assure that selection is
made "in good faith," "non-collusively," and "with equal consideration" of competing
products.).
301. E A. McQuade Tours, 467 F.2d at 188 ("[AIIl interested tour operators were on notice of
the rules."); Livezey v. Am. Contract Bridge League, 1985 U.S. Dist LEXIS 16058, at *42 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 12, 1985) (Rule of reason claim was "weaken[ed]" where plaintiff received a hearing
with "many procedural safeguards."); McCreery Angus Farms v. Am. Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp.
1008, 1019 (S.D. Ill. 1974) ("Ordinarily, the member seems entitled to notice of the charges and
an opportunity to present and time to prepare his defense."); Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at
1066 (Disciplinary proceedings should include at least a "rudimentary hearing" that let an indi-
vidual "petition for consideration of his specific case."); Blubaugh v. Am. Contract Bridge
League, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3178, at *27 (S.D. Ind. June 20, 2001) (same); McCreery, 379 F.
Supp. at 1010-11, 18 (Member should have right "to meet [charges] if he can in a full, fair, and
open hearing" and confront his "actual accuser."); Tropic Film Corp. v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 319 F.Supp. 1247, 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (noting existence of "clear and pre-announced
standards," an "appeal system ... permitting written presentation and oral argument," and a
"detailed procedure" for same); but see Blalock v. LPGA, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1268 (N.D. Ga.
1973) (In dictum: Hearing was unnecessary where decision was "virtually a mathematical appli-
cation of pre-determined standards.").
302. Deesen v. PGA, 358 F.2d 165, 169 (9th Cir. 1966) ("PGA is entitled to adopt reasonable
measures" in deciding applicant was qualified to play professional golf); but see Blalock, 359 F.
Supp. At 1265 (Suspension was imposed as an act of "completely unfettered, subjective discre-
tion ... without hearing from plaintiff" by "competitors . . . who st[ood] to gain financially from
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the antitrust laws demand slightly higher procedural standards for
rules that affect competition directly.303 As before, formal govern-
ment procedures provide the gold standard for private governance. 304
The requirements are also subject to balancing. Thus, Silver's re-
quirements cannot be so burdensome that they "undermine" the asso-
ciation's "very authority . . . to impose sanctions."305 Conversely,
courts require more elaborate procedures when the private associa-
tion wields "tremendous economic power"30 6 or controls the right to
plaintiff's exclusion from the market."); E. A. McQuade, 467 F.2d at 188 ("Nor were the rules
applied to McQuade arbitrarily or discriminatorily."); McCreery, 379 F. Supp. at 1010-11,
("Those who conduct the hearings and make the decisions must be unbiased and maintain open
minds until they have heard the whole story in open hearings with the challenged member.");
Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 675 F.2d 445, 456 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Neither can we conclude
that the executive committee which suspended Brenner was composed of competitors who stood
to gain from his suspension."); Jackson, 340 F.Supp. at 635-36 (Decisionmakers must weigh
evidence "in good faith" and "not in malice" or a desire for "personal vindication."); Blalock,
359 F. Supp. at 1267 (criticizing "completely unfettered, subjective and discretionary determina-
tion of an exclusionary sanction by a tribunal wholly composed of competitors"); Blubaugh, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8187, at *27 (noting that plaintiff been given "the opportunity to challenge
committee members for cause"); cf Deesen, 358 F.2d at 169 (There was, however, no evidence
that a single member could control the process to enforce personal agenda or that committees
have ever discriminated against applicants for personal reasons.).
303. Eliason Corp. v. Nat'l Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126, 130 (6th Cir. 1980) (Rules should
be periodically revised to reflect new technologies.); Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066 (Rule
that required professional players to go to college where some did "not desire" or even have
"the mental and financial ability to do so" was overbroad.); M&H Tire Co., 733 F.2d at 984
(Rule-making must be open to the entire industry and "all interested companies.").
304. Blubaugh, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8187, at *24-25 (The law does not require private
disciplinary procedures "to be a blend of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ... with constitu-
tional and procedural protections afforded to criminal defendants."); McCreery, 379 F. Supp. at
1010 ("This does not imply that the same technical judicial standards as exist in Court trials must
be applied to Association rules and hearings."); Brant v. U.S. Polo Ass'n, 631 F.Supp. 71, 77
(S.D. Fla. 1986) (Suspended polo player had "the opportunity to be heard and defend himself in
a context which, while perhaps not comporting with the rigors required by due process in a court
of law, were sufficient to enable him to present his side of the incident."); but see McCreery, 379
F. Supp. at 1010-11 (criticizing "[olld, ad hoc, informal and pro forma committee procedures
bordering on the arbitrary" as "outmoded and dangerous").
305. Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 381 (D. Ariz. 1983); Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373
U.S. 341, 363 n.15 (1963) (Procedural protection for non-members would not "burden" or slow
the exchange under the circumstances because it already operated similar protections for mem-
bers.); Jackson, 340 F.Supp. at 635-36 ("The directors must, of course, also consider the inter-
ests of [their organization]" when considering action that affects member's livelihood.).
306. Silver, 373 U.S. at 361.
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pursue a business.307 Once again, these balancing approaches imply
that private standards are legitimate and deserve deference. 308
Substantive Limits on Self-Regulation. Section 1's Rule of Reason
famously invites parties to adopt restrictions that enhance competition
more than they harm it. Though difficult to apply, the basic concept is
clear so long as all costs and benefits are priced on the open market.
The problem comes when private rules attempt to balance "both mon-
etary and ethical" 309 goals. Since the latter have no established mar-
ket, balancing is impossible unless and until someone attaches a price
tag.
Prior to the 1970s, courts avoided this issue in two ways. First,
judges refused to apply the antitrust laws to noncommercial enti-
ties.310 This meant that many restrictions were never examined at all.
This exception disappeared when the Supreme Court's Goldfarb31
decision acknowledged that professional societies often pursue com-
307. Brenner, 675 F.2d at 456 (Restraint was unreasonable where suspension was effected by
appellees to prevent him from engaging in his trade); McCreery, 379 F. Supp. at 1019 ("The
complete control of the registered purebred Black Aberdeen Angus breeding business by the
Association means in effect that the Plaintiffs are completely out of the business of raising and
selling purebred registered Black Aberdeen Angus cattle while they are under indefinite suspen-
sion."); Jackson, 340 F.Supp. at 635-36 (noting that member's "livelihood as a Yorkshire breeder
is dependent upon membership"); Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
(Sherman Act forbids any "contract which unreasonably forbids any one to practice his
calling.").
308. Provided that procedures are adequate, Silver courts never second-guess private rules on
substantive grounds. See, e.g., Jackson, 340 F.Supp. at 635 (Review was limited to "with the
fairness of the hearing itself" and "no event would the Court substitute its judgment . . . on the
merits of the case); Blubaugh, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8187, at *24-25 (declining to make sub-
stantive determination beyond evaluating process or sufficiency of evidence); Livezey v. Am.
Contract Bridge League, 1985 U.S. Dist LEXIS 16058, at *50 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 1985); Gunter
Harz Sports, Inc. v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1119 (D. Neb. 1981) (Rule upheld
supporting findings had "objective basis" in fact); but see Lindemann v. Am. Horse Shows, 624
N.Y.S.2d 723, 743 (1994) (Sanction barring accused's spouse, family, employees and others from
participating in events "would appear to be too broad a sanction in the absence of some showing
of an attempt to bypass the original sanction.").
309. United States v. Or. State Med. Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952) (emphasis added) (Pro-
fessional society objected the insurance scheme and replaced traditional doctor-patient relation-
ship with a "tripartite" arrangement that gave employers and insurance companies the right to
review private medical records and influence choice of treatment.).
310. Jonathan E. Seib, Antitrust and NonMarket Goods: The Supreme Court Fumbles Again-
National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents, 104 S.Ct. 2948, 60 WASH. L. REV.
721, 723 (1985); Wendy T. Kirby & T. Clark Weymouth, Antitrust and Amateur Sports: The Role
of Noneconomic Values, 61 IND. L.J. 31 (1985); Marjorie Webster Junior Coll., Inc. v. Middle
States Ass'n of Colls. & Secondary Sch., Inc., 432 F.2d 650. 654-55 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("It is possi-
ble to conceive of restrictions on eligibility for accreditation that could have little other than a
commercial motive . . . . Absent such motives, however, the process of accreditation is an activ-
ity distinct from the sphere of commerce; it goes rather to the heart of the concept of education
itself.").
311. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975).
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mercial goals for themselves and their members. Henceforth, the an-
titrust inquiry would depend on whether the "particular activities" at
issue affected competition. Even so, the Court hinted that professions
could still adopt restrictions "which could properly be viewed as a vio-
lation of the Sherman Act in another context" for valid, noncommer-
cial ends.312
Second, judges refused to compare the value of economic and non-
economic goals. If the challenged restriction served some legitimate,
non-market goal, they almost always found some way to uphold it.313
This changed after Professional Engineers, when the Supreme Court
rejected a professional association's argument that bidding for fixed
price contracts violated its professional ethics.314 Instead, the Court
argued that "the Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on
the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable"3 1 5 and that
any such exemption is "properly addressed to Congress." 316 Justices
Blackmun and Rehnquist concurred but added that it was premature
to "intimat[e]" that professional ethics could never "take account of
benefits other than increased competition." 3 17
312. Id. at 788 n.17; Seib, supra note 310.
313. Neeld v. NHL, 594 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1974) (arguing that private rule's anticompe-
tive effect was both "de minimis" and "incidental to the primary purpose of promoting safety");
Marjorie Webster, 432 F.2d at 654 ("[I]ncidental restraint of trade" by organizations dedicated to
"the liberal arts and the learned professions" would not trigger antitrust liability "absent a pur-
pose to affect commercial aspects of the profession"); Cooney v. Am. Horse Shows Ass'n, 495 F.
Supp 424, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Disciplinary action against owners accused of doping horses was
not anticompetitive unless "the restraint is broader than reasonably necessary to accomplish the
legitimate goal of the regulation."); Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 675 F.2d 445, 456 (2d Cir.
1982) (Sanctions against promoter were not anticompetitive because they "reasonably related to
a policy justifying self-regulation."); Rooffire Alarm Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 202 F. Supp. 166,
169 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) ("An association formed to foster high standards, to mitigate evils in trade
existing through lack of knowledge or information, and to encourage fair competitive opportuni-
ties" did not violate Sherman Act "merely because it may effect a change in market
conditions.").
314. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 689-90; see also United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149,
167-68 (D.D.C. 1982) ("Under established law, then, it would not matter if [defendant's] public
interest arguments were correct. . . .The enactment of the Sherman Act represents a basic policy
decision regarding the centrality of competition in American commercial life. If there are to be
exceptions from that policy in favor of other, different public interest considerations, they must
be made-as occasionally they have been-by the Congress; they cannot be read into the anti-
trust laws by the courts in the guise of construction or interpretation."). For a modern argument
that competition should respect ethical norms, see Cass R. Sunstein, Winner-Take-Less Codes:
The Case of Private Broadcasting, 6 U. CH. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 39 (1999) (arguing that Sher-
man Act should permit broadcasters to self-regulate violent or sexually explicit programming as
a "'third way' between unlimited competition . . . and rigid governmental mandates").
317. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 699 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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The Professional Engineers Court was clearly afraid of letting
unelected judges decide which ethical values were important enough
to trump the market. As Justice Powell later argued: "An antitrust
policy divorced from market considerations would lack any objective
benchmarks"318 and would force courts to "determine what, if any,
weight to give to noneconomic factors." 319 However, Justice Rehn-
quist was noticeably more expansive. He later argued that courts
could still uphold ethical rules where the "restraint is not unreasona-
ble in its effect on competition." 320 This left open the possibility that
ethical goals could sometimes trump damage to competition. 321
The Supreme Court made one last effort to resolve the issue in
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.322 How-
ever, the opinion was strangely ambivalent. On the one hand, the ma-
jority acknowledged that the association had important non-economic
goals; on the other, this fact played no role in its reasoning. 323 In-
stead, the majority argued that amateurism served an economic goal
by making the college game more successful than "sports to which it
might otherwise be comparable." 324 According to this Alice-in-Won-
derland reasoning, the best way to make one market (college football)
more economically efficient was to adopt rules that prevented a sec-
ond market (professional athlete services) from forming at all.
The NCAA Court's focus on purely economic factors was so deter-
mined that most commentators, 325 courts,326 and lawyers327 have as-
318. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977).
319. Kirby & Weymouth, supra note 310, at 32.
320. Community Commc'ns Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 66 (1982). The opinion
asked whether the Sherman Act should apply to municipalities. Rehnquist argued in dissent that
forcing municipal officials to obey antitrust law would necessarily strip them of the right to legis-
late social regulations. Id. at 60 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Arizona v. Maricopa County Med-
ical Society similarly avoided the issue by arguing that a medical society's attempt to fix prices
was entirely unrelated to "public service or ethical norms." 457 U.S. 332, 349 (1982).
321. Professor Pitofsky has similarly suggested that the exception could apply where the im-
pact on competition is de minimis. Pitofsky, supra note 12 (arguing that private ban on beer ads
to college students would be permissible "since beer companies would retain many other ave-
nues of advertising to attract the audience of legal buyers").
322. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984).
323. Id.
324. Id. at 102.
325. James F. Ponsoldt, The Application of Sherman Act Antiboycott Law to Industry Self-
Regulation: An Analysis Integrating Nonboycott Sherman Act Principles, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 22
(1981) ("Safety and other social policies not supported by legislation seem to have been rejected
both as defenses in a Rule of Reason case and as arguments against the use of the per se rule.");
Seib, supra note 310, at 725. ("The judiciary could not defer to what it might consider a higher
value" even where the restraint on competition is "insignificant.").
326. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1065, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(rejecting eligibility rule that forced players to complete college before turning professional:
"However commendable this desire may be, this court is not in a position to say that this consid-
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sumed that antitrust law no longer considers non-economic goals at
all. Yet the majority never quite says this. Moreover, White's dissent,
which Rehnquist joins, argues that antitrust law should permit col-
leges to pursue "legitimate noneconomic goals" even when this im-
pacts "the free market."328 Based on this lingering ambiguity, many
lower courts continue to supplement their purely economic analyses
with alternative holdings that invoke ethical goals.3 2 9
Pricing Externalities. Even after NCAA, courts can still uphold pri-
vate restrictions on externalities that might otherwise destabilize mar-
kets3 30 or impose financial costs like court liability, new regulation,331
eration should override the objective of fostering economic competition which is embodied in
the antitrust laws. If such a determination is to be made, it must be made by Congress and not
the courts."); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021-22 (10th Cir. 1998) (Restriction on hiring
assistant coaches could not be justified by need to "open[] up coaching positions for younger
people" or protect university budgets since "we may not consider such [social] values unless they
impact upon competition.").
327. Pitofsky, supra note 12 ("[S]ome have cited [Professional Engineers], which can be inter-
preted to rule out consideration of non-economic goals . . . in a rule of reason analysis, as a
threat to industry self-regulation.").
328. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 134 (White, J., dissenting).
329. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 1992) (Alternate holding: NCAA rules
provide a bulwark against the "quick buck" attitudes of professional sports, preserve a "proper
focus" on education, and prevent colleges from being transformed into "'minor league farm
systems"' for the NFL); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (The "over-
riding purpose" of NCAA eligibility rules is to "prevent commercializing influences" intruding
on the "Athenian concept of a complete education." Such rules "may be judged or struck down
by federal antitrust law."); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 383 (D. Ariz. 1983) (Antitrust
laws do not reach NCAA rules that are primarily noncommercial and "rooted in the ... protec-
tion of amateurism"); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1988) (Student eligi-
bility rules that serve "purely or primarily noncommercial objectives" held outside antitrust
laws); Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 379 (upholding rules which had no commercial purpose but "per-
tain solely to the NCAA's stated goal of preserving amateurism"); cf NYNEX Corp. v. Discon,
Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1998) (Antitrust laws only apply to acts done for "competitive rea-
sons" and do not reach efforts to defraud regulators, "nepotism," "personal pique" and "busi-
ness morality more generally."). Various FTC Commissioners have historically endorsed this
view as well. Thomas B. Leary, Chairman, Fed. Trade. Comm'n, Self-Regulation and The Inter-
face Between Consumer Protection and Antitrust (Jan. 28, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
public-statements/2004/01/self-regulation-and-interface-between-consumer-protection-and-anti-
trust (arguing that broadcast self-censorship "reflects a non-commercial value that.... I would
argue, and I think you will win if you argue . . . the courts would uphold").
330. Almost all of these cases involve sports leagues that limit how much members can spend
in order to preserve the on-field competition needed to attract fans. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101-02
("And the integrity of the 'product' cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an
institution adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing
field might soon be destroyed."); Law, 134 F.3d at 1023-24 (In dictum: Limits on hiring assistant
coaches might be justified to keep games "competitive" and "a marketable product"); M&H
Tire Co., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973, 984 (1st Cir. 1984) (In dictum: Associa-
tion could require members to purchase tires within a fixed price range "so that the number of
participants would not dwindle"); Martin v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 697 F.Supp. 997, 1001 (N.D.
Ill. 1988) ("[D]og shows could not function in the absence of rules regulating the conduct of
participants."); Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1117 (D.
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and (perhaps) lost public goodwill. 332 However, the common feature
of these judgments is that the externality will eventually suppress
profits.333
This rationale is too limited to justify the kinds of open-ended inter-
ventions aimed at protecting the general public instead of sharehold-
ers. According to this reasoning, most if not all of our five examples
should be illegal. And indeed, one might argue, following Rehnquist,
that assigning price tags to these social impacts is best left to legisla-
tors. The trouble is that judges cannot really avoid setting price tags.
Before the 1970s, courts always let ethics trump competition. This
gave private ethical goals what amounted to an infinite price tag.
Neb. 1981) (upholding rule banning novel tennis rackets which "was intended to accomplish the
legitimate goals of preserving the essential character and integrity of the game of tennis . . . and
preserving competition by attempting to conduct the game in an orderly fashion" and not an
"intent to injure . . . any . . . manufacturer or distributor of tennis equipment); Seib, supra note
310, at 733 (Athletic organizations can "impose regulations essential to protect the existence and
integrity of their sport" including game rules, equipment standards, and safety regulations.); but
see Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (League-wide rule excluding imma-
ture players was overbroad and should, at a minimum, be modified so that "each team could
decide what level of risk it is willing to tolerate.").
331. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs, 435 U.S. 679, 696 n.22 (1978) ("Courts have, for instance,
upheld marketing restraints related to the safety of a product, provided that they have no an-
ticompetitive effect and that they are reasonably ancillary to the seller's main purpose of pro-
tecting the public from harm or itself from product liability."); see also Tripoli Co., Inc. v. Wella
Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 937 (3rd Cir. 1970) (Restrictions on resale of caustic hair care products to
general public were "reasonable" and "appropriate in the public interest" whether motive was to
protect public or to avoid potential liability.); Neeld v. NHL, 594 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1974)
(upholding rule excluding one-eyed players: League's interest in avoiding personal injury liabil-
ity is "[ailso of some importance and legitimate concern." ); but see Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at
408 (NFL rule designed to protect younger athletes from injury and over-training, though "laud-
able," could be "dismissed out of hand" since it had "nothing to do with promoting
competition.").
332. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d 409 (questioning whether NFL rule protecting young players
could be justified as protecting the NFL brand); but see Molinas v. NBA, 190 F. Supp. 241, 244
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) (Recent scandals made it "absolutely necessary" for professional basketball "to
exhume gambling from its midst .. . in order to survive."); cf Brenner v. World Boxing Council,
675 F.2d 445, 456 (2d. Cir. 1982) (Sports leagues can adopt rules for "reasonable objectives" not
limited to participant parity, safety, and league integrity.); Am. Fed. of Television & Radio Art-
ists v. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 407 F. Supp. 900, 901-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Private standard
was a "positive response" to criticism by U.S. senator, FCC, and private activists.); Tropic Film
Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1247, 1249 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (Movie industry
could adopt voluntary rating system to avoid "an onslaught of legislative censorship.").
333. At least in theory, industry must take these costs at face value without, for example,
placing a higher value on human life than judges or bureaucrats do. Ted Mann, Rail Safety and
the Value of a Life, WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2013, 10:32 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887323582904578485061024790402 (Academic and government estimates place
economic value of saving a life "about an order of magnitude" higher than wrongful death
cases.).
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More recently, post-NCAA courts pretend to ignore ethics altogether.
This prices the externality at zero.3 34
Starting from this zero-or-infinity choice, almost anything looks like
an improvement. If firms set private limits on how much damage pro-
duction does to the human or natural environment, judges should take
industry's willingness to assume new burdens at face value. Of course,
such decisions are self-interested and industry's suggested price could
be much too low. But it is still an improvement over zero. A fortiori,
this argument is even stronger where courts find that the body that
produced the standard is sensitive to consumer preferences and/or has
shared power with multiple stakeholder groups.
C. The Sherman Act (II): Protecting Democracy
Today's judges and scholars almost always analyze the Sherman Act
in terms of economic efficiency. This is anachronistic.
Microeconomic theory barely existed in 1890335 and was cluttered
with uncertainty. Instead, lawmakers seem to have been far more in-
terested in political arguments.336 Anglo-American political thought
had long worried that private wealth would capture government and
impose a plutocracy. 337 The rapid growth of nationwide corporations
in the late 19th Century convinced Congress that "[e]ven individually,
some corporations were big enough to dominate state governments,
and if they should combine among themselves, they might come to
dominate the federal government as well." 3 3 8
But, in that case, when did economic power become a political threat?
Sherman himself argued that:
If we will not endure a king as a political power we should not en-
dure a king over the production, transportation, and sale of any of
the necessaries of life. If we would not submit to an emperor, we
should not submit to an autocrat of trade, with power to prevent
competition, and to fix the price of any commodity.33 9
334. One could argue that the NCAA-style economic efficiency arguments are so elastic that
modern judges have unfettered discretion to save almost any ethical rule they approve of. But
this is hardly amounts to a principled or satisfactory legal doctrine.
335. Modern microeconomic theory is conventionally dated from publication of Alfred Mar-
shall's Principles of Economics in 1890. The Sherman Act was passed the same year.
336. Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in POLITICAL ECON-
OMY OF THE SHERMAN Acr: THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS 20, 28 (E. Thomas Sullivan ed.,
1991); see also David Millon, The Sherman Act and The Balance of Power, in POLITICAL ECON-
OMY OF THE SHERMAN Acr: THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS supra note 338, at 85.
337. Millon, supra note 336, at 86.
338. Hofstadter, supra note 336, at 28.
339. THEODORE E. BURTON, JOHN SHERMAN 359 (1906), available at https://archive.org/de-
tails/johnsherman017282mbp.
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However polemical, Sherman's rhetoric turned otherwise vague po-
litical concerns into an objective economic inquiry, i.e. whether the
defendant could "dictate terms" or "command[ ] the price of la-
bor."340 Early Supreme Court cases echoed Sherman's theme by ar-
guing that antitrust law was meant to stop "any one commodity" from
falling "within the sole power and subject to the sole will of one pow-
erful combination of capital." 341
The Supreme Court's Standard Oil decision introduced the Rule of
Reason and shifted the focus to market efficiency. 342 While the older
plutocracy interpretation never disappeared entirely, it slowly faded
as Americans got used to living with large corporations. But that is
hindsight. In the 1930s and 1940s, the rise of Fascism with its empha-
sis on private control by worker-management councils breathed new
life into the old fears. These crystalized in FOGA. 3 4 3 While the Court
could and did resolve the matter on conventional economic
grounds,344 it did not stop there. Instead, it criticized private power
more generally:
In addition to all this, the combination is in reality an extra-govern-
mental agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation and re-
straint of interstate commerce, and provides extra-judicial tribunals
for determination and punishment of violations, and thus "trenches
upon the power of the national legislature" and violates the
statute. 345
This seemed to say that all private governance was illegitimate, at
least when it included a government-like power to punish. Legal
scholars took this as a sign that "[a]s the external impact of the stan-
dard setting becomes more severe ... a point has been reached where
it appears that no private group is a safe repository for such quasi-
340. Id.
341. United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 324 (1897).
342. Millon, supra note 336, at 86-87.
343. The Court did not articulate a policy argument against private self-governance, observing
only that it "trenches upon the power of the national legislature." Ponsoldt, supra note 325, at
25. "This was arguably an indication by the Court of its intolerance for industry self-regulatory
schemes of any kind." Id.
344. Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). As the Court noted, para-
graph 3 of the Clayton Act prohibits contracts that condition the sale of goods on agreeing not to
use or deal in competing goods. Id. at 464. It also found that restrictions that narrowed the
outlets which manufacturers could sell to, the suppliers that retailers could buy from, and re-
quired Guild members to disclose the "intimate details of their individual affairs" violated Sher-
man Act § 1. Id. at 465.
345. Id. (quoting Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 242 (1899)).
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governmental power." 346 However, it was hard for courts to define
this "point" in any intelligible way.3 4 7
The difficulty in using political concepts to say when private power
was and was not acceptable may explain why Justice Douglas re-
verted to Sherman's quasi-economic approach in his famous Colum-
bia Steel dissent. Controlling steel prices, Douglas argued, gave "a
handful of men" the power to wreck the economy. From this stand-
point the "problem of bigness" was not just economic but also "a so-
cial menace":
[Private] power . .. can be benign or it can be dangerous. The phi-
losophy of the Sherman Act is that it should not exist. For all power
tends to develop into a government in itself. Power that controls
the economy should be in the hands of elected representatives of
the people, not in the hands of an industrial oligarchy. Industrial
power should be decentralized. It should be scattered into many
hands so that the fortunes of the people will not be dependent on
the whim or caprice, the political prejudices, the emotional stability
of a few self-appointed men. . . . That is the philosophy and the
command of the Sherman Act. It is founded on a theory of hostility
to the concentration in private hands of power so great that only a
government of the people should have it. 348
The great advantage of the Sherman/Douglas approach was that it
reduced a messy political judgment to a familiar and reasonably objec-
tive economic inquiry. Still, it was incomplete. Economic power suffi-
cient to wreck the economy surely poses a political danger. But it is
just as surely not the only danger. For this reason, Douglas' test failed
to clarify FOGA's suggestion that smaller concentrations of power are
likewise illegal.
Courts continued to echo FOGA's broad distrust of private power
into the 1980s. 34 9 Since then, most lawyers have come to assume that
346. Association Action Affecting Nonmembers, supra note 288, at 1047.
347. Justice Black's "trenches on the legislature" remark also seemed to suggest that private
bodies could still regulate subjects not committed to Congress. The trouble in the 20th Century
was that Congress could and did address almost everything. Among other things, this put
thousands of private health and welfare standards off-limits.
348. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 535-36 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). Learned Hand made much the same point in the First Circuit's Alcoa decision: "We have
been speaking only of the economic reasons which forbid monopoly; but, as we have already
implied, there are others, based upon the belief that great industrial consolidations are inher-
ently undesirable, regardless of their economic results. In the debates in Congress Senator Sher-
man himself ... showed that among the purposes of Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an end
to great aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the individual before them."
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1945).
349. Linseman v. World Hockey Association, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1321 (1977) (criticizing pri-
vate groups that "pool[] their economic power" to "substitute[] their own private government
for the rule of the marketplace"); M&H Tire Co., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d
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Justice Black's blanket condemnation of "private tribunals" would be
phrased more narrowly today.350 Doctrinally, courts have usually im-
plemented this instinct by arguing that Justice Black's ban on govern-
ment-style "tribunals" should not be read to include standards bodies
that are "truly voluntary," 351 merely persuasive, 352 enforced solely by
social norms ("naming and shaming"), 353 or lack significant market
power.354 Professor Elhauge has taken these arguments even further
973, 983 (1st Cir. 1984) ("We recognize that one of the evils of group boycott activity is that a
private group may arrogate to itself quasi-judicial powers, a normally public function. In those
situations where private groups are permitted to exercise such public powers, they may be re-
quired to afford fair and appropriate procedures."); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325
F. Supp. 1049, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1971) 1061 (arguing that NBA members had "established their
own private government"; the antitrust laws do not prevent private aggregations of power from
existing, but do regulate "the use of private aggregations of power"); Blalock vs. LPGA, 359 F.
Supp. 1260, 1262 (N.D. Ga. 1973) ("[C]ombinations designed to influence coercively the trade
practices of boycott victims" are per se unlawful even when there is no purpose "to eliminate
them as competitors." (emphasis added)).
350. Pitofsky, supra note 12.
351. United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149, 164 (D.D.C 1982) (Rules
that are voluntary in both theory and actual practice are not subject to the antitrust laws even
when backed by the threat of public criticism.).
352. Tropic Film Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 319 F.Supp. 1247, 1254 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(Distinguishing FOGA: Film ratings agreement was not designed to eliminate competition but
only to advise exhibitors and the public of the films' content. Coercion was also absent); Cos-
tello Publ'g Co. v Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Lower court should consider
whether Catholic Church condemnation of book was an illegal boycott when enforcement was
mediated by retailers' independent decision to stock it); Association Action Affecting Nonmem-
bers, supra note 288, at 1048 ("The case is substantially different where the association merely
transmits findings to nonmembers or grants a seal of approval without itself attempting to en-
force the standard. First, the dependence on nonmembers for the implementation of the stan-
dard introduces a possible check on its unreasonableness, and where these nonmembers are the
ultimate consumers themselves, the problem of unchecked representation largely disappears. In
addition, a new value-that of the free flow of information-appears in support of the action of
the association.").
353. Tropic Film, 319 F.Supp. at 1250 (noting that ratings were "entirely voluntary" and that
newspapers and theatres would have refused to advertise X-rated films with or without formal
ratings).
354. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding market power existed where
contested rule had successfully depressed the the price of coaching services); Brant v. U.S. Polo
Ass'n, 631 F. Supp. 71, 77 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (Suspension was too short to have any "palpable
anticompetitive effect" on any relevant market.). A more doubtful version of the rule argued
that associations could coerce their own members but not non-members. This must have been
cold comfort to members who found themselves coerced after losing a 51-49 vote. Hennessey v.
NCAA, 564 F.2d 1147, 1151 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The 'group boycott' cases typically have involved
situations where there was some concerted refusal to deal with persons or companies because of
some characteristic of those persons and companies. Here, the participants in the combination-
the colleges-remain free to deal with any of the persons in the 'target group'-the assistant
coaches. The restriction rather depends upon a particular attribute of the participants them-
selves; namely, how many assistant coaches they have."); Coll. Athletic Placement Servs., Inc. v.
NCAA, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7050, at *8-10 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 1974) ("The principle of the
group boycott cases-that it is prima facie unreasonable for a dominant group to combine to
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by arguing that FOGA's criticism of "extra-governmental agenc[ies]"
is limited to situations where actors have "financial interests that
seem[ ] certain to bias their extra-governmental conduct."355 Our five
examples would almost certainly survive this test. Finally, some liti-
gants have argued that Justice Black's objection should not apply
where members of the executive branch have invited industry to self-
regulate. Short of a congressional immunity statute, however, the law
is unclear. 356
D. FOGA's Shadow
The Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission concede
that self-governance is often preferable to government regulation 357
and have repeatedly promised not to enforce FOGA against private
standards bodies they approve of.358 Despite this, most private gov-
ernance initiatives spend large amounts of time and energy studying
antitrust concerns. 359 This often leads to self-imposed limits that
block action and complicate deliberation. 360 It is reasonable to think
that other private initiatives never form at all. These costs would be
acceptable given a clear policy justification. However, we have seen
that the actual case law is vague.
coerce"-did not apply where challenged restriction was designed to regulate member behavior
and impact on third parties was "at best indirect.").
355. Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REv. 667, 742
(1991). Elhauge's proposal would be a sharp departure from Justice Douglas' Columbia Steel
argument that the mere existence of private power is intolerable whether or not we expect it to
be benign.
356. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. at 168 (Expressing uncertainty over whether
whether official approval is "an appropriate element for consideration in a Rule of Reason anal-
ysis."). Even assuming that government could confer immunity, the grant would also have to
extend beyond general principles to address the specific provisions at issue. Id. at 169.
357. Ponsoldt, supra note 325, at 1 n.1 (1981) (Justice Dept. policy holds "'economic competi-
tion, not public or private regulation, is the most efficient form of economic organization."'
(quoting John Shenefield, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Local Action and Profes-
sional Activites: Increased Antitrust Scrutiny, 1979 Bond Attorneys Workshop (Oct. 11, 1979))).
358. Leary, supra note 329 ("[I]t is unlikely that we will interfere with appropriately tailored
industry efforts to restrict" the sale of "legal, but potentially harmful products to children.").
359. Kolk, supra note 124 (4C collaboration believed that any discussion of coffee prices
would violate antitrust law); JASON POTTS, MULTI-STAKEHOLDER COLLABORATION FOR A Sus-
TAINABLE COFFEE SECTOR 13-14 (May 2004), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdfl2004/scicof-
fee..backgrcund2.pdf (analyzing antitrust limits on 4C rule-making); F.A. Morris, A.M. Seward,
and A.J. Kurzrok, A Nonproliferation Third Party for Dual-Use Industries - Legal Issues for
Consideration, (Pac. Nw. Nat'l Labs. Report No. PNNL-21908 2012) (arguing that voluntary
restrictions on nuclear technology sales do not violate the Sherman Act).
360. Auld et al., supra note 170, at 280 (describing private trade association's belief that re-
quiring members to purchase FSC lumber would violate Sherman Act); Kuenkel et al., supra
note 114. Some producer countries have accused buyers of using competition policy as an excuse
to avoid price negotiations. Auld et al., supra note 170.
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VII. REFORMING PRIVATE GOVERNANCE LAW
Modern law insists that private self-governance must: (a) observe
minimal due process protections; (b) refrain from any intervention
that raises prices or reduces output in the name of non-market "ethi-
cal" issues; and, more controversially; and (c) never exercise coercive
power rising to the level of an extra-judicial tribunal.
In practice, the first rule sets a low bar and seldom causes difficul-
ties. However, the second and third rules are different. Since the Su-
preme Court's NCAA decision, judges have repeatedly evaded the
second rule by pretending that ethical rules are pro-competitive. Sim-
ilarly, Justice Black's rule against non-government tribunals has dis-
solved into metaphysical inquiries about when economic power
becomes coercive. The net result is that antitrust law does not even
try to address the central question of when private power is legitimate.
This article returns to the courts' traditional instinct that private
power has value and deserves deference. In particular, we argue that
the Sherman Act should respect whatever mix of private and public
power best implements mainstream public opinion. Section A de-
scribes how relatively small changes to doctrine can implement this
principle. Here, the main insight is that judges should expect corpora-
tions facing strong price or market share competition to be reasonably
democratic. This is a fortiori true when corporations deliberately
share power with other affected parties. Following the old Sherman/
Douglas agenda, the proposed rule reduces vague political fears to
objective inquiries into membership and market structure. Section B
suggests additional subsidiary tests that courts can deploy to decide
when private governance is sufficiently democratic to receive
deference.
A. Rationalizing Antitrust Law
This section argues that small doctrinal changes can rationalize ex-
isting case law. In keeping with our earlier discussion,361 we discuss
the Sherman Act's procedural, economic efficiency and political doc-
trines separately.
Procedural Protections. We have argued that clear and orderly pro-
cedures reduce the cost of obtaining and processing information and
make private politics more predictable. Silver and the common law
cases that preceded it meet this goal reasonably well. Moreover, our
examples suggest that modern initiatives are so exquisitely rule-bound
that procedural challenges are rarely an issue. The main remaining
361. See supra Section VI.
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defect of these doctrines lies in the courts' assumption that govern-
ment-style procedures set the gold standard for building democratic
institutions. However, our examples suggest that external politics or
delegation can likewise improve democracy. Government-style proce-
dural rules may be less necessary in these circumstances. This is par-
ticularly true when industry shares power with groups that can be
reliably counted on to oppose cartelization. 362
Protecting Competition. The Supreme Court's NCAA opinion has
convinced most lawyers that private rules should avoid non-market
ethical goals as much as possible. In economic terms, this amounts to
valuing all externalities at zero. From a policy standpoint, this is a
catastrophe. Externalities are, after all, a market defect. If the Rule
of Reason permits rules that make markets possible, it should equally
permit rules that make them more efficient.
Even so, judges' caution is understandable. Firms could, after all,
invent sham externalities to disguise otherwise illegal cartels. Still,
this seems unlikely in the typical case where an industry standard lim-
its the harms that production is allowed to inflict on the human or
natural environment. Examples include private standards that require
companies to pay workers a living wage, purchase credits for carbon
emissions, and avoid operations in environmentally sensitive areas.
All of these cases add to production costs and are therefore likely to
raise prices or cut production. But this is only because the previously
unpriced externality is now reflected in the true cost of production.
Absent very special facts, such standards are unlikely to support carte-
lization.363 More often, companies will earn less than they did
before. 364 Judges should take this as strong evidence that companies
are sincere. This is a fortiori true when the usual Silver procedures
have been satisfied or fierce market share competition empowers a
shadow electorate of consumers and employees.
Protecting Democratic Government. FOGA assumes that private
self-governance is inherently inferior to public institutions. But if we
362. Leibowitz, supra note 17 ("If a board is more than simply a group of competitors, but
includes others who would be harmed by an anticompetitive agreement then that makes it less
likely that a particular rule is a result of a private agreement to restrict competition.").
363. For example, an industry with two production technologies A and B could place an astro-
nomical price tag on pollutants that are uniquely associated with process B. Similarly, von En-
gelhardt and Maurer show that increasing industry costs can sometimes support high prices by
preventing new firms from entering the market. See Maurer & Engelhardt, supra note 249.
364. Leary, supra note 329 ("When you have a compelling social concern, when the alterna-
tive to private regulation may be even more heavy-handed government regulation, when you are
actually asking your members to do something that is against their immediate economic inter-
est-not in aid of it-I think there is a narrow window for consideration of non-economic values
in trade association codes and standards.").
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care about democracy, it should not matter where we find it. Justice
Black was wrong to fear government in private hands. The real sin is
putting government in unrepresentative hands.
This article has argued that the Douglas/Sherman agenda was on
the right track: In order to be workable, limits on private political
power must first be translated into some reasonably objective inquiry.
Our proposed doctrine holds that antitrust law should never interfere
on political grounds where corporations are strongly constrained by
price or market share competition. Here, corporate views are almost
certain to reflect fear of liability and/or strong shadow electorates.
Conversely, judges should continue to fear private power when price
and quality cartels let executives impose their personal views on the
market.
Even without these conditions, courts should still respect private
decisionmaking where industry shares power with other affected
groups. Of course, delegation can always be rescinded, and groups
can walk away. While delegation lasts, however, courts should assume
that outcomes endorsed by corporations, environmentalists, and
NGOs benefit all of these groups and are to that extent legitimate.
Admittedly, courts must still be able to detect and ignore sham dele-
gations to a few tame or token members. 365 One very useful bench-
mark will be to ask whether private politics attracts more (and more
diverse) participants than official hearings. 366
Reducing political concerns to objective questions of market struc-
ture or delegation is bound to be controversial. However, these objec-
tions are best evaluated by asking how democratic particular
initiatives really are. For now, our examples suggest that many, and
perhaps most, private standards should be upheld.
Conflicting Traditions? Finally, we note that the Sherman Act's
pro-market and pro-democracy traditions can occasionally conflict,
most notably when private standards establish a national market that
displaces state-by-state regulation.367 The advantage of our proposed
365. Leibowitz, supra note 17 ("Now, I don't think that board full of industry competitors
becomes diverse with the addition of a single stray 'public' member who may, or may not, be
engaged in the board's rulemaking; but it is hard to say in the abstract when the composition of a
state board is sufficiently diverse that the board does not have to be supervised to have recourse
to the state action defense.").
366. The range of companies that showed up to debate private biosafety standards for artifi-
cial DNA was noticeably broader in the public channel. MAURER, supra note 253. They also
included more non-Americans. Id.
367. Eliason Corp. v. Nat'l Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126, 129-30 (6th Cir. 1980) (Develop-
ment and enforcement of nationwide health and sanitation standards for refrigerators was pro-
competitive because it allowed complying manufacturers "to be reasonably sure that they will
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reforms is that they resolve NCAA's ban on ethical rules and FOGA's
ban on private tribunals traditions in exactly the same way: By recog-
nizing that private power can be democratically legitimate. This sug-
gests that judges should respect private standards so long as they
appear to be reasonably democratic. State officials who nevertheless
object can push back by enacting regulations to overrule the private
result.
B. Assessing Legitimacy
Announcing doctrine is only the beginning. Over time, courts will
also develop tests to decide when doctrine is satisfied. Our examples
suggest four possibilities.
External Politics. We have seen that that external politics often re-
veal the costs and benefits of private standards faster and, to that ex-
tent, more democratically than traditional institutions. Courts should
be open to this possibility. The fact that the winning standard is con-
trolled by a narrow group should not matter if it has been repeatedly
rewritten to compete with other standards.
Transparency. Transparency maximizes corporate incentives to re-
spect public opinion. All else equal, a group that debates its standards
in full view of the press and competitors deserves more deference than
one that does not.36 8 In the words of former FTC Commission Jon
Leibowitz: "A board is acting more like a government agency than
simply a group of competitors when it works in the open." Conversely,
a board that acts behind closed doors "is more likely indistinguishable
from any other group of competitors." 36 9
Government Endorsement. Traditional government often sees pri-
vate governance as an instrument for extending its influence. It seems
singularly unjust to punish private parties for complying with these
wishes. Worse, punishment is the quickest way to guarantee that no
private party will ever cooperate again. Depriving traditional govern-
ment of such a useful policy lever frustrates the will of the people and
is inherently undemocratic. To be sure, one might worry that officials
will ask the private sector to do things that would be unconstitutional
if the government acted directly. In that case, the better solution is to
not have to modify their product in order to meet the different requirements of many
jurisdictions.").
368. One synthetic DNA group called an open meeting to debate and vote on its final stan-
dard. Outside attendees included U.S. government officials, companies working on a competing
standard, and a reporter from Nature. MAURER, supra note 253.
369. Leibowitz, supra note 17. See also, Pitofsky, supra note 12 (explaining that broadcasters'
decision to make self-governance process public "enhances the credibility of the program").
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limit officials' discretion to request cooperation in the first place. The
bottom line is that government should also be able to endorse specific
goals whenever it could regulate directly. Once this happens, courts
should defer. 370
VIII. CONCLUSION
The explosion of private governance since the 1990s has pushed
participating companies into a legal limbo. This is patently unfair and
undercuts a policy lever that government officials say they want.
Somehow, John Sherman's attempt to protect public institutions from
private power has produced a doctrine that cripples both.
One set of issues involves the Rule of Reason. This article has ar-
gued that businesses can almost always be trusted to place a price tag
on externalities. The Supreme Court should confirm that NCAA does
not prevent private associations from confronting ethical problems
and externalities.
The other, deeper question is what to do with the Sherman Act's
tangled political interpretation. FOGA's great simplifying conceit was
that no private power is ever legitimate. But if we care about democ-
racy, it should not matter where we find it. The genius of the Sher-
man/Douglas tradition is that it transformed nebulous fears of
plutocracy into a well-defined economic inquiry. The problem, like
many bright line tests, is that it is incomplete. This article has argued
for an updated doctrine, which holds that corporations facing strong
price or market share competition are at least as answerable to
shadow electorates as the average elected politician. Alternatively,
private standards bodies that fail to meet this test should still be al-
lowed to legitimize themselves by convincingly sharing power with
others.
As usual, courts will need new tests to implement these doctrines.
Broad delegation, transparency, and government endorsement should
all be strong "plus factors" in deciding when private governance is
legitimate.
370. Our lumber example shows that this defense should not exist where government state-
ments are non-specific and leave room for radically different interpretations.
